Lee Hsien Loong v Leong Sze Hian [2021] SGHC 66 a situation where the English Court of Appeal had found that the primary meaning of allegedly defamatory words was a comment that had been honestly expressed. The English Court thus was disinclined to expend time and money to determine the remaining issue, which was “theoretical” and could not succeed unless it had been maliciously advanced. Since malice had not even been pleaded, there was no realistic prospect of success. By contrast, a legitimate and viable endpoint, namely the pursuit of vindication of reputation and damages, is being pursued by the plaintiff on the instant facts. It thus suffices for me to note that even if Jameel goes beyond a conflicts of law or forum shopping issue, the principle laid down is not applicable in this case. As Choo Han Teck J observed on Jameel in Chan Boon Siang and others v Jasmin Nisban [2018] 3 SLR 498 at [7], “although the court’s resources ought not to be used for the pursuit of trivial or pointless claims, each case must be determined on its own facts”. The doctrine in Derbyshire 76 The case of Derbyshire stands for the proposition that a government organ or entity cannot sue in defamation, as that would otherwise impede criticism, and thus freedom of speech. In his speech at 547F, Lord Keith observed that: … it is of the highest public importance that a democratically elected governmental body, or indeed any governmental body, should be open to uninhibited public criticism. The threat of a civil action for defamation must inevitably have an inhibiting effect on freedom of speech. 77 The plaintiff argues that the rule in Derbyshire is not applicable as he is claiming here as an individual, and not as a government organ or entity. The defendant argues to the contrary that the instant proceedings have been brought by the plaintiff to circumvent the rule in Derbyshire, and that it is in fact the 42