03/02/2020 AYYADURAI v. FLOOR64, INC | 270 F.Supp.3d 343... | 20170907d75| Leagle.com j y ,( ) p g j y ,( ) , , y, p p and place of business of the parties, and (d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered." Restatement (Second) Con ict of Laws § 145(2). Defendants rely heavily on Sarver to support their assertion that § 145 requires this Court to apply California's anti-SLAPP statute. In Sarver, the Ninth Circuit found it compelling that the plainti , an army sergeant, failed to establish that he was a resident of New Jersey. Sarver, 813 F.3d at 898. Rather, the record suggested that his alleged injuries occurred in multiple jurisdictions. See id. at 898-99. Therefore, none of the § 145 factors weighed strongly in favor of applying New Jersey law. Id. Here, by contrast, there is no question that Ayyadurai resides in Massachusetts, and no reason to abandon the basic framework of § 150. 5. Floor64 has also moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5) for improper service. The complaint and summons addressed to it were served on Sunnia Lin, Masnick's wife, at their home address. The corporation contends that such service is improper under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(1) (B), which requires that corporations be served "by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to an o cer" of the company. However, California law permits service on corporations by "leaving a copy of the summons and complaint ... at [the corporation's agent's] usual mailing address ... with the person who is apparently in charge thereof, and by thereafter mailing a copy of the summons and complaint by rst-class mail...." Cal. Code Civ. P. § 415.20(a). Accordingly, it appears that Floor64 was properly served pursuant to California law, which constitutes proper service under the federal rules. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1), 4(h)(1)(A). The motion to dismiss for improper service will therefore be denied. 6. That additional element in cases involving matters of public concern derives from First Amendment principles. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776, 106 S.Ct. 1558, 89 L.Ed.2d 783 (1986) (holding that, where the speech at issue is a matter of public concern, there is a "constitutional requirement that the plainti bear the burden of showing falsity"). That constitutional requirement has superseded traditional common-law rules that truth was an a rmative defense and that the defendant, therefore, bore the burden of proving the statement was true. See id.; Pan Am Sys., 804 F.3d at 66. 7. Whether words like "fake" or "phony" are imprecise is context-dependent. See Gray, 221 F.3d at 248-49 ("Whether calling something a `fake' is or is not protected opinion depends very much on what is meant and therefore on context."). "To say that a dollar bill is a fake would, in most situations (but perhaps not all), be taken to mean that it was a counterfeit; and to say that the defendant was knowingly passing a fake dollar bill would surely be actionable, if false. At the other extreme, where there were two productions of Phantom of the Opera, and the defendant called one of them `fake' and `phony,' this court held that the adjectives were subjective aesthetic judgments protected as opinion." Id. at 249 (citing Phantom Touring, 953 F.2d at 728). In the context of this case, the imprecision inherent in words like "fake" is dependent upon the imprecision in the de nition of "e-mail" itself, and the resulting ambiguity as to who "invented" e-mail. 8. As discussed below, disclosing the factual basis for a statement of opinion is a separate basis on which statements may be protected under the First Amendment. 9. Not every article at issue fully explains the factual basis for the conclusion that plainti 's claim is false. However, the articles that do not provide a full explanation refer to, and often provide hyperlinks to, the articles that do. Furthermore, as plainti has recognized, the articles should be viewed together and are each relevant context for the others. (See Pl. Opp. to Def. Beadon's Mot. to Dismiss at 1 ("All of Defendants' defamatory articles ... must be considered collectively because all of the defamatory articles were part and parcel of an integrated, intentional campaign to destroy Dr. Ayyadurai's reputation."). 10. Plainti does not appear to dispute that the quotation accurately represents the way that he has presented the RAND report. 11. In his opposition, plainti single such statement. contends that there are also defamatory statements included in Beadon's commentary. However, he has failed to identify a 12. Plainti suggests that the comments, which were posted by an anonymous user, may have been posted by Beadon himself. (See Pl. Opp. to Beadon's Mot. to Dismiss at 6 n.2). However, the bare allegation that "it is certainly possible" that Beadon authored the comment is insu cient, particularly when presented as an argument in opposition papers rather than in the complaint itself. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ("The plausibility standard ... asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully."); Coyne v. City of Somerville, 972 F.2d 440, 442-43 (1st Cir. 1992) (stating that, under Rule 12(b)(6), courts "take the well-pleaded facts as they appear in the complaint") (emphasis added). https://www.leagle.com/decision/infdco20170907d75 14/15