03/02/2020 Privacy International v Secretary of State for Foreign And Commonwealth Affairs & Ors (Rev 2) [2016] UKIPTrib 15_110-CH (17 October 2016) 30. S.45 therefore recognised the lawfulness of obedience to an intercept warrant under the hand of the Secretary of State and established a prohibition on disclosing the contents of a statement of account specifying the telecommunication services provided for any other person "otherwise than in the course of his duty". 31. As Mr de la Mare acknowledged, the Secretary of State could not secure compulsory disclosure of information specifying the telecommunications services provided to a subscriber ("billing records") unless there was a statutory power which imposed on telecommunications providers a duty to do so. 32. The only available power was to be found in s. 94(1) and (2).  S. 94(3) imposed a duty on the person to whom a direction had been given to comply with it:   "(3).  A person to whom this section applies shall give effect to any direction given to him by the Secretary of State under this section, notwithstanding any other duty imposed on him under this Act."  33. The clear words of s. 94(1) to (3), read with s. 45(2), empowered the Secretary of State to direct telecommunications providers to provide billing and subscriber records to the Security Service and GCHQ in the interests of national security or foreign relations and required the telecommunications providers to comply with the direction.  Nothing in the context available to Parliament would have necessitated any implied limitation on that right and duty: if the Secretary of State could, by a warrant, require telecommunications providers to intercept, or to facilitate the interception by the Security Service and GCHQ of telephone communications, there was no reason to construe the statutory power and duty under s. 94 so as to exclude the lesser intrusion effected by the disclosure of communications data to the Secretary of State.  34. Consequently, the billing records could only be obtained under s.94. It is plain that, in accordance with ordinary principles of statutory construction, contrary to the submissions of Mr de la Mare, s.45 must be read subject to s.94, and s.94 must be read in the context of s.45.  35. The power to issue intercept warrants was placed on a statutory footing by s.2 of the Interception of Communications Act 1985 ("the 1985 Act"), which read: "2 Warrants for interception (1) Subject to the provisions of this section and section 3 below, the Secretary of State may issue a warrant requiring the person to whom it is addressed to intercept, in the course of their transmission by post or by means of a public telecommunication system, such communications as are described in the warrant; and such a warrant may also require the person to whom it is addressed to disclose the intercepted material to such persons and in such manner as are described in the warrant. (2) The Secretary of State shall not issue a warrant under this section unless he considers that the warrant is necessary— (a) in the interests of national security ; (b) for the purpose of preventing or detecting serious crime ; or (c) for the purpose of safeguarding the economic well-being of the United Kingdom." 36.    S. 11(1) of and Schedule 2 to the 1985 Act established a new s. 45 in the 1984 Act:  "45(1).  A person engaged in the running of a public telecommunications system who otherwise than in the course of his duty intentionally discloses to any person --   (a) the contents of any message which has been intercepted in the course of its transmission by means of that system; or   (b) any information concerning the use made of www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/format.cgi?doc=/uk/cases/UKIPTrib/2016/15_110-CH.html&query=([2016])+AND+(UKIPTrib)+AND+(15_110-CH) 11/53