03/02/2020 Privacy International v Secretary of State for Foreign And Commonwealth Affairs & Ors (Rev 2) [2016] UKIPTrib 15_110-CH (17 October 2016) (a) in accordance with the order of any court or for the purposes of any criminal proceedings; (b) in accordance with any warrant, authorisation or notice issued, granted or given under any provision of [RIPA].  (c) in compliance with any requirement imposed (apart from that Act) in consequence of the exercise by any person of any statutory power exercisable by him for the purpose of obtaining any document or other information … (3) In subsection (2) above … 'statutory power' [has] the same meanings as in [RIPA]." "Statutory power" is defined in s. 81(1) of RIPA: "'statutory', in relation to any power or duty, means conferred or imposed by or under any enactment or subordinate legislation".  40 Thus, as a matter of ordinary language, s.45, as amended by RIPA, recognised that disclosure might be made under RIPA or in consequence of the exercise by any person of any other statutory power exercisable for the purpose of obtaining any document or other information.  It did so, by amendment of the Act in which s.94 appears.  It would therefore be surprising if Parliament can be taken to have intended by these words to do other than preserve that power.   41. The position is put beyond doubt by s.80 of RIPA:  "Nothing in any of the provisions in this Act, by virtue of which conduct of any description is or may be authorised by any warrant, authorisation or notice, or by virtue of which information may be obtained in any manner, shall be construed – (a) as making it unlawful to engage in any conduct of that description which is not otherwise unlawful under this Act and would not be unlawful apart from this Act; ... (c) as prejudicing any power to obtain information by any means not involving conduct that may be authorised under this Act."  As a matter of construction, therefore, RIPA did not revoke the power of the Secretary of State under s.94 to give directions for the provision of communications data to PECNs or their duty to comply with such a direction.  In any event, so far as collection of communications data is concerned, s.45 continued in force (as amended).  S. 1(1) of RIPA, which made it an offence to intercept communications, did not, in any event, apply to communications data (s.2 (5) of RIPA).   42. The power under s.94 was preserved by the Communications Act 2003 which repealed the operative provisions of the 1984 Act, apart from s.94.  Further, as set out in paragraph 9 above, it amended s.94 to substitute "necessary" for "requisite or expedient" in subsection (1), and it added subsection (2A):   "The Secretary of State shall not give a direction under subsection (1) or (2) unless he believes that the conduct required by the direction is proportionate to what is sought to be achieved by that conduct."  Mr. de la Mare submits that these words are directed only or principally at Article 1, Protocol 1 ECHR to ensure that telecommunications providers and internet service providers are not required to bear the cost of interference with their property rights in communications data.  We disagree.  There is no reason so to limit the occasions on which the obligation can arise.  The words are especially apt to www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/format.cgi?doc=/uk/cases/UKIPTrib/2016/15_110-CH.html&query=([2016])+AND+(UKIPTrib)+AND+(15_110-CH) 13/53