and the intermediate panel exceeded its authority in taking up the mantle of advocate and doing so on PSP’s behalf. Finally, Carey—which is non-binding on this Court in any event—is readily distinguishable. There, the Commonwealth Court found that the “circumstances present[ed] a uniquely suitable case for supplementation.”67 Evidence submitted by the agency in question “did not describe the responsive records or connect the security threat to them,” and there was an open question as to whether redaction would serve the agency’s interests. 68 Here, PSP submitted the Burig Affidavit describing the responsive records and attempting to connect the alleged security threat to them. AR 6-9 has already been redacted. Thus, because Carey offers little guidance with respect to the circumstances of this dispute, it need not be “disapproved.”69 Consistent with McKelvey 70 and Eiseman, 71 our decision today is grounded in faithful adherence to the structure of the RTKL, and in the knowledge that PSP had every opportunity to justify its resistance to disclosure. The RTKL establishes that agencies bear the burden of proving that an exception to the disclosure rule applies. As the Commonwealth Court recognized, PSP has not carried that burden. 72 Nothing remains, then, but for the panel below to order that PSP 67 Carey, 61 A.3d at 377. 68 Id. 69 ACLU Br. at 21-22. 255 A.3d at 404 (“We note that the Department received numerous opportunities to submit evidence and argument before the OOR, and chose not to take advantage of those opportunities.”). 70 125 A.3d at 29 (“[I]t contravenes th[e] salutary purpose [of the RTKL] for [an agency] to advance shifting positions in opposing disclosure”). 71 PSP III at *5 (concluding that the Burig Affidavit is “insufficient to connect the text of AR 6-9 with the risks [it] articulates”). The Dissent argues that the Commonwealth Court’s authority in this instance “derived from this Court’s bestowal of broad fact-finding (…continued) 72 [J-3-2023] - 15