Scarborough v. Frederick Cnty. Sch. Bd. 517 F. Supp. 3d 569 (W.D. Va. 2021) never trained on First Amendment law and viewpoint discrimination as they relate to the use of social media. Defendants make the valid point that this conclusion requires a leap of logic, and that the alleged failure of school officials to take certain actions in connection with Scarborough's critical social-media posts does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that FCSB failed to train them, or trained them inadequately. Defendants may ultimately be proven correct on this point, but Scarborough's supposition is plausible enough to survive dismissal on the pleadings. See, e.g., Farrar v. City of Chi. , 291 F. Supp. 2d 747, 753 (N.D. Ill. 2003) ("Plaintiff, however, consistently alleges that Defendant City of Chicago has a policy of failing to train police officers how to respond to domestic violence. At this [ Rule 12(b) (6) ] stage of the proceedings, Plaintiff needs only provide Defendant City of Chicago with fair notice of her claim. She has done so."). By construing the Second Amended Complaint in the light most favorable to Scarborough, as this court must for a motion to dismiss, Scarborough's allegations regarding FCSB's failures are sufficient to infer that FCSB acted with deliberate indifference by failing to train their employees on sound social-media policies and the First Amendment. See City of Canton , 489 U.S. at 390, 109 S.Ct. 1197 (explaining that city officials could "reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent" if "the need for more or different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights."); see also Littell v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist. , 894 F.3d 616, 627 (5th Cir. 2018) ("[A]nd if the 586 school district nonetheless failed to provide those officials with any legal training on the subject— then the factfinder will be entitled (but not required) to infer that the school district acted with deliberate indifference to its students' Fourth Amendment rights."); In re MicroStrategy, Inc. Sec. Litig. , 115 F. Supp. 2d 620, 627 (E.D. Va. 2000) ("In considering a motion to dismiss a complaint [under Rule 12(b)(6) ], a court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, read the complaint as a whole, and take the facts asserted therein as true." (citation omitted)). Moreover, Scarborough alleged that Mr. Edwards—FCSB's employee— messaged her on Facebook and espoused their "terms and conditions" as the reason she was blocked from Facebook. This indicates that Defendants made conscious decisions and had a policy about what was and was not allowed on their online platforms, further *586 supporting Scarborough's claim. The court will therefore deny the motion to dismiss the failure-to-train claim. CONCLUSION For these reasons, the court will grant in part and deny in part Defendants' motion to dismiss (ECF No. 37). The court will dismiss (1) Scarborough's equal protection claim as to all Defendants with prejudice and (2) her procedural due process claim only against Defendants Sovine and Angelo with prejudice. The motion will be denied in all other respects. The court will issue a separate order. 13