Accordingly, unlawful or arbitrary restrictions of internet access or social media platforms would constitute violations of the rights to freedom of expression and information. 47.Given that both sides to the present case do not dispute that access to the internet and internet-enabled services like social media platforms have human rights implications, particularly for freedom of expression and the right to information, the only determination the Court must make under this issue is whether the measures implemented by the Respondent were lawful limitations on the freedom of expression and the right to receive information. 48.The Court recalls that, generally, for any measure that limits a fundamental human right, including the rights to freedom of expression and access to information, to be lawful under international human rights law, it must: (i) be prescribed by a written law; (ii) serve a legitimate purpose; and (iii) be necessary and proportionate in a democratic society. (See Konate v Burkina Faso (merits) (2014) 1 AfCLR 314, paras 125-154). Accordingly, Principle 9 of the African Commission's Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information in Afi·ica 2019 also states: "States may only limit the exercise of the rights to freedom of expression and access to information, if the limitation: (a) is prescribed by law; (b) serves a legitimate aim; and (c) is a necessary and propo1iionate means to achieve the stated aim in a democratic society." 21

Select target paragraph3