[2021] 2 MLRA Peguam Negara Malaysia v. MKINI Dotcom Sdn Bhd & Anor 457 His Lordship also further elaborated on the manner of ascertaining knowledge by citing learned author Sir Hari Singh Gour on The Penal Law of India (11th Edn) Vol 3, at p 2381 where it was observed: “Criminal knowledge, is then, in such cases demonstrated a posteriori. It takes into account not only knowledge but means of knowledge, not only the knowledge which is, but which, judging from the effect, ought to have been in the accused. A person may then truthfully declare that he did not know that his act was likely to cause death and yet he may be rightly found to have had that knowledge. The truth is that in civil cases arising out of tort as well as in criminal cases, the standard which the court fixes before itself is that of a reasonable man and the question it ultimately asks itself is, not whether the accused had the knowledge, but whether as a reasonable man he could have had that knowledge. And for this purpose, the act itself is the real test.” [Emphasis Added] [67] Further at p 2387 the learned author remarked that: “It has been said that in inferring knowledge the court looks to the result. If it is one which could not have been arrived at without fore-knowledge, the court presumes it. Such knowledge may be legitimately presumed where the assault is committed with an axe or a dao or other deadly weapon, or where a man is hit with great force on a vital part of his body.” [Emphasis Added] [68] In the same case, Augustine Paul J went on to observe that “it can be presumed that a person had knowledge of the danger of his act and every person is presumed to have some knowledge of the nature of his act.” Thean J, in elaborating on the manner of inferring knowledge said in Public Prosecutor v. Phua Keng Tong & 2 Other Appeals [1986] 2 MLRH 226 that “proof of knowledge or belief on the part of an accused is a matter of inference from facts.” [69] Thean J, went on to quote the case of RCA Corp v. Custom Cleared Sales Pty Ltd [1978] FSR 576; 19 ALR 123, a decision of the Court of Appeal in New South Wales in dealing with the question of knowledge of infringement of copyright. He said that “proof of knowledge is always a matter of inference, and the material from which the inference of the existence of actual knowledge can be inferred varies infinitely from case to case.” Further, he held that a court is entitled to infer knowledge of a person on the assumption that such a person has the ordinary understanding expected of him in his line of business, unless he convinced otherwise. [70] In the same vein, Richard Malanjum FCJ in Emmanuel Yaw Teiku v. PP [2006] 1 MLRA 808 held that proof of intention or knowledge could generally be inferred from proved facts and circumstances. It is difficult to do so by other means unless there is a clear admission by the person himself. His Lordship quoted the case of Chan Pean Leon v. PP [1956] 1 MLRH 44 where Thomson J observed that: