MATÚZ v. HUNGARY JUDGMENT 11 editor-in-chief’s letter to the board had prompted any response (see paragraphs 7 and 8 above). Thus, the Court is satisfied that the publication of the book took place only after the applicant had felt prevented from remedying the perceived interference with his journalistic work within the television company itself – that is, for want of any effective alternative channel. 48. The Court also notes that a rather severe sanction was imposed on the applicant, namely the termination of his employment with immediate effect. 49. Finally, as to the manner in which the applicant’s labour case was reviewed, the domestic courts found that the mere fact that the applicant had published the book was sufficient to conclude that he had acted to his employer’s detriment. However, they paid no heed to the applicant’s argument that he had been exercising his freedom of expression in the public interest, and limited their analysis to finding that he had breached his contractual obligations. Moreover, the Supreme Court’s judgment explicitly stated that the subject matter of the case was limited to an employment dispute and did not concern the applicant’s fundamental rights (see paragraph 16 above). As a result, they did not examine whether and how the subject matter of the applicant’s book and the context of its publication could have affected the permissible scope of restriction on his freedom of expression, although it is such an approach that, in principle, would have been compatible with the Convention standards (see Sokołowski v. Poland, no. 75955/01, § 47, 29 March 2005; and Ungváry and Irodalom Kft. v. Hungary, no. 64520/10, § 57, 3 December 2013). 50. Being mindful of the importance of the right to freedom of expression on matters of general interest, of the applicant’s professional obligations and responsibilities as a journalist on the one hand, and of the duties and responsibilities of employees towards their employers on the other, and having weighed the different interests involved in the case, the Court concludes that the interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression was not “necessary in a democratic society”. 51. Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION 52. Article 41 of the Convention provides: