27/07/2023, 22:38 CURIA - Documents 87 However, as is apparent from the case-law cited in paragraph 61 above, the seriousness of the interference stems from the risk, particularly in view of their number and variety, that the data retained, taken as a whole, may enable very precise conclusions to be drawn concerning the private life of the person or persons whose data have been retained and, in particular, provide the means of establishing a profile of the person or persons concerned, information that is no less sensitive, having regard to the right to privacy, than the actual content of communications. 88 Accordingly, the retention of traffic or location data, that are liable to provide information regarding the communications made by a user of a means of electronic communication or regarding the location of the terminal equipment which he or she uses, is in any event serious regardless of the length of the retention period and the quantity or nature of the data retained, when that set of data is liable to allow precise conclusions to be drawn concerning the private life of the person or persons concerned (see, as regards access to such data, judgment of 2 March 2021, Prokuratuur (Conditions of access to data relating to electronic communications), C‑746/18, EU:C:2021:152, paragraph 39). 89 Even the retention of a limited quantity of traffic or location data or the retention of those data for a short period are liable to provide very precise information on the private life of a user of a means of electronic communication. Furthermore, the quantity of the data available and the very specific information on the private life of the person concerned that results from the data can be assessed only after the data have been consulted. However, the interference resulting from the retention of those data necessarily occurs before the data and the information resulting therefrom can be consulted. Thus, the assessment of the seriousness of the interference that the retention constitutes is necessarily carried out on the basis of the risk generally pertaining to the category of data retained for the private lives of the persons concerned, without it indeed mattering whether or not the resulting information relating to the person’s private life is in actual fact sensitive (see, to that effect, judgment of 2 March 2021, Prokuratuur (Conditions of access to data relating to electronic communications), C‑746/18, EU:C:2021:152, paragraph 40). 90 In the present case, as is apparent from paragraph 77 above and as was confirmed at the hearing, a set of traffic and location data retained for 10 weeks and 4 weeks respectively may allow very precise conclusions to be drawn concerning the private lives of the persons whose data are retained, such as habits of everyday life, permanent or temporary places of residence, daily or other movements, the activities carried out, the social relationships of those persons and the social environments frequented by them and, in particular, enable a profile of those persons to be established. 91 In the third place, as regards the safeguards provided for by the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings, which are intended to protect the retained data against the risks of abuse and against any unlawful access, it must be emphasised that the retention of and access to those data each constitute, as is clear from the case-law recalled in paragraph 60 above, separate interferences with the fundamental rights guaranteed by Articles 7 and 11 of the Charter, requiring a separate justification pursuant to Article 52(1) of the Charter. It follows that national legislation ensuring full respect for the conditions established by the case-law interpreting Directive 2002/58 as regards access to retained data cannot, by its very nature, be capable of either limiting or even remedying the serious interference, which results from the general retention of those data provided for under that national legislation, with the rights guaranteed by Articles 5 and 6 of that directive and by the fundamental rights to which those articles give specific effect (judgment of 5 April 2022, Commissioner of An Garda Síochána and Others, C‑140/20, EU:C:2022:258, paragraph 47). 92 In the fourth and last place, as regards the European Commission’s argument that particularly serious crime could be treated in the same way as a threat to national security, the Court has already held that the objective of protecting national security corresponds to the primary interest in protecting the essential functions of the State and the fundamental interests of society through the prevention and punishment of activities capable of seriously destabilising the fundamental constitutional, political, economic or social structures of a country and, in particular, of directly threatening society, the population or the State itself, such as terrorist activities (judgment of 5 April 2022, Commissioner of An Garda Síochána and Others, C‑140/20, EU:C:2022:258, paragraph 61 and the case-law cited). https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document_print.jsf;jsessionid=A4432EEFFE3535A201E714AE6441EE66?mode=DOC&pageIndex=1&docid=265881… 19/28