Furthermore Counsel maintained that a speech by its nature is a reduction into tangible form or material form without any further deed. He relied on Black's Law Dictionary 9th edition for the definition of the word "tangible" as a work capable of being understood by the mind. Secondly the definition of "tangible medium" which is an expression in copyright to mean any material form in which a work can be expressed and communicated either directly or through a machine. He further submitted that it is no wonder that the authorities recognise that a speech or address and sermons can enjoy copyright protection. He submitted that this would rest the controversy about copyright in speeches. The method of reduction of the speeches into material form is immaterial on the question of authorship of the material. Counsel submitted that the two tests for establishing authorship are originality and work having been reduced into a tangible form and not by whom. What is meant to be original is the work that is capable of copyright protection. As far as the Plaintiff‟s case is concerned, the Plaintiff's Counsel submitted that speeches like works of literature are capable of protection. It is not the method of reduction into tangible form. Section 5 (1) (a) of the Copyright and Neighbouring Rights Act makes provision for works of a similar nature to addresses, someone is et cetera. Furthermore section 5 (1) (j) includes any other work in the field of literature in whatever manner delivered known or to be known in the future. Secondly there has to be independent effort as envisaged in section 4 (3) of the Act. The independent work is not the recording but the creation of the work. Counsel submitted that at the trial the Plaintiff adduced unchallenged evidence of this independent effort. Secondly the Plaintiff led unchallenged evidence that he envisaged the attention of the media whom he had prepared to address in the particular incident at Parliament. He was not ambushed by the journalist and he expended his effort, skill and judgment arising from experience to address the media. Even if the speeches were to be treated as interviews in spite of the departure from pleadings of the defence, it is settled law that an interviewee is possessed of copyright in his answers in the case of Suid vs. Newsweek, 503 F. Supp 146 (D.D.C. 1980)) and in Quinto versus Legal times, 506 F. Supp. 554 (D.D.C. 1981)) where it was held that in the interviewer and interviewee have ownership interests in their separate contributions. With reference to the case of Target vs. WMAQ Channel S Chicago, 57.U.S.P.Q 2d 1083 (SD 111.2000), the case dealt with performance and not copyright. It also concerned common law and not statutory law. Thirdly the court considered the prisoners non-registration of copyright under applicable law whereas in Uganda copyright is not subject to any formality. The court further considered the prisoners expressive unprotected ideas unlike in this suit were the evidence of the Plaintiff‟s skill, effort was adduced and his expressions were unique, confident, affectionate yet respectful. Finally there were considerations of the right to free speech as the Defendant in that suit was a media house unlike the Defendants in this suit. Decision of Hon. Mr. Justice Christopher Madrama Izama *^*~?+: 11