Price v. City of N.Y. 15 Civ. 5871 (KPF) (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 25, 2018) purposes of this motion — it appears that the City had a policy of disbelieving Plaintiff's allegations of abuse and considering her to be a "fabricator." was only being retracted because the victim feared retaliation from her abuser. Stated another way, it is objectively unreasonable to arrest and initiate a prosecution of a person that the officer knows to be innocent of any crime. See Scotto v. Almenas, 143 F.3d 105, 113 (2d Cir. 1998); Ricciuti v. N.Y.C. Trans. Auth., 124 F.3d 123, 128 (2d Cir. 1997). The Court must also deny the City Defendants' correlative motion to dismiss the official-capacity claims against Simmons and the Monell claim against the City.9 It appears that the City Defendants' sole argument for dismissal of these claims is that Plaintiff did not allege a constitutional violation by Simmons — that is, a sufficient post-arraignment restraint. (Def. Br. 19 ("[A] desk appearance ticket with a single court appearance for that ticket is not a sufficient deprivation of liberty.")). As explained above, Plaintiff has, in fact, stated a § 1983 claim against Simmons for malicious prosecution. On this basis alone, denial of the City Defendants' motion is warranted. 9 The Court considers these claims together, because an official-capacity claim against a governmental official is the functional equivalent of a claim against the governmental entity itself. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985); Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978)); Tanvir v. Tanzin, 889 F.3d, 72, 81-82 & n.7 (2d Cir. 2018) (discussing the distinctions between individual and official-capacity claims). 21 In any event, Plaintiff has set forth sufficient facts suggesting that the City was a moving force behind Simmons's conduct. Plaintiff alleges that at the *21 direction of the Manhattan District Attorney's Office, the NYPD placed her on a "Do Not Serve / Arrest Alert List" and labeled her as a "fabricator." (FAC ¶¶ 24-25). Based on this allegation of "deliberate conduct" by the City, see Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cty., 520 U.S. at 404 — which the Court accepts as true for the 22 Against this background, Plaintiff alleges that Simmons framed her for fabricating a police report, despite Simmons's having no reason to believe that Plaintiff was lying when she initially reported to Officer Diaz that Powell had beaten her. (FAC ¶¶ 26-45). In the context of the facts alleged by Plaintiff, Simmons's conduct is inexplicable, unless one accepts Plaintiff's assertion that the NYPD had a policy of labeling her a fabricator, as this would supply a plausible explanation for Simmons's conduct. Stated another way, acting pursuant to a municipal policy of labeling Plaintiff a fabricator, Simmons initiated a prosecution against Plaintiff for filing a false report. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694 ("[W]hen execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury, [ ] the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983."). Because, at this stage in the litigation, the allegations plausibly suggest that the City's policy of labeling Plaintiff a fabricator was the moving force behind Simmons's otherwise unconstitutional conduct, the Court denies the City Defendants' motion to dismiss the Monell *22 claim against the City and the official-capacity claim against Simmons for malicious prosecution.10 10 The Court pauses to note a potential ambiguity in Plaintiff's allegations. At Plaintiff's initial criminal court appearance, "[s]he was told the charge would be adjudicated in six months if she did not get re-arrested." (FAC ¶ 49). This allegation suggests that Plaintiff was offered, and accepted, an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal, or "ACD." See N.Y. Crim. Pro. L. § 170.55(2); Stone v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., No. 11 Civ. 3932 (SMG), 2014 WL 3110002, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. July 8, 2014) ("An ACD is a conditional dismissal 10