SPECIAL COLLECTION OF THE CASE LAW ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION through special legislation to counter the prevalence of SLAPP suit litigation, as has been done in other jurisdictions.60 The courts recognise that the legislation under which SLAPPs cases are brought is problematic and enables abuse, especially in cases against public officials and public figures. Regional courts are directly or implicitly asking states to reform such legislation and bring it to compliance with international human rights standards. This has implications for the prevention of SLAPPs at the national level. Courts are relying on existing abuse of process provisions when dismissing SLAPP cases Even when the legal framework does not provide specific protection against SLAPPs, there might be other procedural remedies that allow for the dismissal of cases, such as “abuse of process” provisions or provisions prohibiting vexatious litigation. Some courts are accepting requests of defendants to dismiss such cases under these provisions, albeit in an inconsistent manner. When doing so, some courts might examine the motivation or conduct of the plaintiffs in bringing the case, while other courts look beyond motivation and consider whether the case has a reasonable chance to succeed. For instance: l l 60 61 62 63 The motivation of the plaintiff was considered by the High Court of Delhi in M/S. Crop Care Federation of India v. Rajasthan Patrika (PVT) LTD. The Court considered that the plaintiff’s attempt was plainly to stifle public debate about the use of pesticides and insecticides.61 The Court examined the case under Order 7 Rule 11 (which enables the court to summarily reject a suit at the very beginning, without proceeding to record the evidence or conduct a trial). The Court referred to the Indian Supreme Court decision that found that under these provisions, “if on a meaningful-not formal-reading of the plaint it is manifestly found to be vexatious and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a right to sue, the judge should exercise his power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled.”62 After considering the complaint as a whole and qualifying it as a SLAPP, the Court determined that the defendants were able to establish that the plaintiff did not disclose any triable cause of action on defamation.63 The Court thus dismissed the case. The motivation of the plaintiff was also relied on under the abuse of process defence by the Western Cape High Court in Mineral Sands Resources (Pty) Ltd and Others v Reddell and Others. The Court first referred to the abuse of process doctrine from the common law and highlighted that “[i]t appears that the defamation suit is not genuine and bona fide, but merely a pretext with the only purpose to silence its opponents and critics. Litigation that is not aimed at vindicating legitimate rights, but is part of a broad and purposeful strategy to intimidate, distract and silence public criticism, constitutes improper use of the judicial Ibid., para. 21. M/S. Crop Care Federation of India v. Rajasthan Patrika (PVT) LTD, op.cit., paras 18 & 23. Ibid., para 20. Ibid., para 26. 15