follows an improper path of reasoning when it justifies reinstating the chambers judge’s of the competing values at play under legislation designed to discourage SLAPPs; the protection of individual reputation and freedom of expression are. Moreover, the promotion of equality is not one of the core values underpinning freedom of expression. Assigning any role to the promotion of equality in the assessment of the public interest in protecting expression goes against the doctrine of content neutrality embraced by the Court in its jurisprudence. More importantly, the promotion of equality is in no way a factor tethered to the text of s. 4(2)(b), and for this reason alone, is not a relevant factor in the public interest weighing exercise. Finally, restricting the availability of tort actions for defamation can have a chilling effect. In the context of defamatory counter-speech, interpreting s. 4 of the PPPA so as to deprive defamed parties who have suffered serious harm of their day in court could very well be detrimental to public debate. It could prevent those who hold controversial or unpopular views from entering the public arena to share them. This conclusion does not turn the concept of chilling effect on its head. The deprivation, through a court order, of a party’s right to vindicate a legitimate claim imposes a legal penalty on that party. In the instant case, the chambers judge erroneously ignored factors aggravating the harm likely to have been or to be suffered by N, despite the fact that they were specifically argued by him. In addition, he gave little consideration to the 2023 SCC 14 (CanLII) dismissal order on the basis that H’s expression promotes equality. Equality is not one