paras. 112-13; see also Echelon Environmental Inc. v. Glassdoor Inc., 2022 ONCA legislative intent behind s. 4 of the PPPA, and s. 4(2)(b) in particular. [143] Consequently, I will first analyze whether the chambers judge erred in concluding that Mr. Hansman has a valid fair comment defence. Afterwards, I will address whether the chambers judge erred in his analysis of the public interest hurdle. As I explain below, I am of the view that the chambers judge committed reviewable errors both in his assessment of the fair comment defence and in his analysis of the public interest hurdle. Indeed, the chambers judge misconstrued the applicable test under s. 4(2)(a)(ii) and (b) of the PPPA. Further, he misconstrued the law on defamation and on the fair comment defence, and failed to direct his mind to the quality of the expression at issue when assessing the public interest in protecting it. Therefore, the applicable standard of review is correctness unless the chambers judge’s findings are not affected by these errors (Bent, at para. 77, citing Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 235, at paras. 8 and 36). A. Fair Comment Defence There Are Grounds to Believe That Mr. Hansman Cannot Avail Himself of a Fair Comment Defence for at Least Some of His Statements [144] Under s. 4(2)(a)(ii) of the PPPA, the plaintiff must demonstrate that “the applicant has no valid defence in the proceeding”. The standard is not a very demanding 2023 SCC 14 (CanLII) 391, at para. 12 (CanLII)). Furthermore, this approach is directly in line with the