Law Society of Kenya v Attorney General & another [2021] eKLR 51. The Respondents submit that the ratification by Cabinet put paid any legal objections on the status and capacity of the NSAC and that the same is a non-issue in the present circumstances. The Respondents submits that the Cabinet Secretary for interior is an agent of the National Executive including the Cabinet and that directives by the National Executive in respect to police matters cannot be impeached just because they were not specifically made by the Cabinet Secretary for Interior but by Cabinet wherein, the Cabinet Secretary is a member. 52. The Respondents also submits that the pedantic approach adopted by the Petitioner that seeks to have the Cabinet Secretary Interior treated as being distinct from the rest of Cabinet and functioning independent of Cabinet constitutes the legalism that the Constitution sought to depart from by providing for a purposive interpretation thereof. Citing Mativo J in Abdi Hussein Abdi & 3 others v The Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission [2017] eKLR, the Learned Judge held as follows: ……...The Constitution must broadly, liberally and purposively be interpreted so as to avoid the ‘austerity of tabulated legalism’ and so as to enable it to continue to play a creative and dynamic role in the expression and the achievement of the ideals and aspirations of the nation, in the articulation of the values bonding its people and in disciplining its Government[3]and its organs. 18. This Court has on several occasions in the past pronounced upon the proper approach to constitutional construction embodying fundamental rights and protections. What is to be avoided is the imparting of a narrow, artificial, rigid and pedantic interpretation; to be preferred is one which serves the interest of the Constitution and best carries out its objects and promotes its purposes. All relevant provisions are to be considered as a whole and, where rights and freedoms are conferred on persons, derogations there from, as far as the language permits, should be narrowly or strictly construed.[4] As was appreciated by the majority In the Matter of the Principle of Gender Representation in the National Assembly and the Senate:-[8] Certain provisions of the Constitution of Kenya have to be perceived in the context of such variable ground situations, and of such open texture in their scope for necessary public actions. A consideration of different constitutions is highly legalistic and minimalistic, as regards express safeguards and public commitment. But the Kenya Constitution fuses this approach with declarations of general principles and statements of policy. Such principles or policy declarations signify a value system, an ethos, a culture, or a political environment within which the citizens aspire to conduct their affairs and to interact among themselves and with their public institutions. Where a constitution takes such a fused form in its terms, we believe, a court of law ought to keep an open mind while interpreting its provisions. In such circumstances, we are inclined in favour of an interpretation that contributes to the development of both the prescribed norm and the declared principle or policy; and care should be taken not to substitute one for the other. In our opinion, the norm of the kind in question herein, should be interpreted in such a manner as to contribute to the enhancement and delineation of the relevant principle, while a principle should be so interpreted as to contribute to the clarification of the content and elements of the norm. 53. The Respondents further submit that the National Police Service in carrying out its important role under the Constitution is not precluded from coordinating, collaborating and cooperating with other institutions and organs of government. Citing the Supreme Court in In the Matter of Interim Independent Electoral Commission [2011] eKLR, the Court held that: [60] While bearing in mind that the various Commissions and independent offices are required to function free of subjection to “direction or control by any person or authority”, we hold that this expression is to be accorded its ordinary and natural meaning; and it means that the Commissions and independent offices, in carrying out their functions, are not to take orders or instructions from organs or persons outside their ambit. These Commissions or independent offices must, however, operate within the terms of the Constitution and the law: the “independence clause” does not accord them carte blanche to act or conduct themselves on whim; their independence is, by design, configured to the execution of their mandate, and performance of their functions as prescribed in the Constitution and the law. For due operation in the matrix, “independence” does not mean “detachment”, “isolation” or “disengagement” from other players in public governance. Indeed, for practical purposes, an independent Commission will often find it necessary to co-ordinate and harmonize its activities with those of other institutions of government, or other Commissions, so as to maximize results, in the public interest. Constant consultation and co-ordination with other organs of government, and with civil society as may be necessary, will ensure a seamless, and an efficient and effective rendering of service to the people in whose name the Constitution has instituted the safeguards in question. The moral of this recognition is that Commissions and independent offices are not to plead “independence” as an end in itself; for public-governance tasks are apt to be severely strained by possible “clashes of independences” http://www.kenyalaw.org - Page 15/34