Page: 14 been prepared by employees in relation to a Minister’s constituency affairs. The records were in the bare possession of the Ministry of Tourism because they were physically stored in the Ministry’s office. However, Arbitrator Liang held they were not in the “control” of the Ministry because they were not created by employees “in respect of matters within the mandate of the Ministry or to be used in the Ministry,” had been “kept in separate files” and “had not been integrated with other Ministry records.” Applying that same reasoning, Mr. O’Connor’s CAS files were kept on the City’s email server and in that respect could be said to be in the bare possession of the City, but they were not created in respect of matters within the mandate of the City, they were kept in a separate file, and they were not integrated with other City records. The same policy reasons would apply to exclude these records from the operation of MFIPPA. Indeed, if anything, there are stronger policy reasons for excluding the documents in this case than there were in the Ministry of Tourism case. [51] Finally, it is relevant to address the IPC decision in Order PO-1725, which was so heavily relied upon by the Arbitrator in this case. In that case, the requester sought access to the electronic agenda of an employee at the Premier’s office. The same agenda contained both governmental appointments and personal appointments. The entire agenda was found to be within the control of the government institution. In my view, the critical distinction between that case and this one is the extent to which personal and governmental information were combined within the electronic agenda. That is not the situation in this case. That said, it does not follow that personal emails not filed in a separate folder (as was the case here) are necessarily subject to the operation of the Act. Much will depend on the individual circumstances of each case, but generally speaking, I would expect very few employee emails that are personal in nature and unrelated to government affairs to be subject to the legislation merely because they were sent or received on the email server of an institution subject to the Act. G. CONCLUSION AND ORDER [52] In my opinion, the Arbitrator erred in law in concluding that the records in this case can be said to be within the custody or control of the City of Ottawa. Applying a correctness standard, this is a sufficient basis to set aside her decision. [53] However, I have also considered whether the decision could stand if a reasonableness standard is applied, as advocated by the respondents. Applying that analysis, however, I come to the same conclusion. Dunsmuir establishes that a decision can be said to be reasonable if it “falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law.”18 In my view, it is not reasonable for emails belonging to a private individual to be subject to access by members of the public merely because they are sent or received on a government owned email server. That is not a sensible or logical result whether as a question of fact or a question of law. The implications for the many thousands of employees who work in government offices across this country are staggering. I do not consider this decision to fall within the range of reasonable possible outcomes described by the Supreme Court in Dunsmuir as necessary to meet the reasonableness standard. By either analysis – correctness or reasonableness – the decision cannot stand. 18 Dunsmuir, at para. 47