Case5:15-xr-90304-HRL Document30 Filed07/29/15 Page13 of 46 1 tracking in Knotts did not implicate the Fourth Amendment because “[a] person travelling in an 2 automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements 3 from one place to another.” Id. at 281. The Knotts Court, however, left open the possibility that 4 advances in surveillance technology would require it to reevaluate its decision. See id. at 283-84 5 (explaining that “if such dragnet type law enforcement practices as respondent envisions should 6 eventually occur, there will be time enough then to determine whether different constitutional 7 principles may be applicable”). United States District Court Northern District of California 8 The following year, in United States v. Karo, the U.S. Supreme Court cabined Knotts to 9 surveillance in public places. 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984). In Karo, the police placed a beeper in a 10 container belonging to the defendant and monitored the beeper’s location electronically, including 11 while it was inside a private residence. Id. at 708-10. Tracking the beeper inside the home, the 12 Karo Court explained, “reveal[ed] a critical fact about the interior of the premises that the 13 Government is extremely interested in knowing and that it could not have otherwise obtained 14 without a warrant.” Id. at 715. As a result, the Karo Court held that monitoring the beeper inside 15 the home “violate[d] the Fourth Amendment rights of those who have a justifiable interest in the 16 privacy of the residence,” even though the officers could not have known, when they planted the 17 tracking device, that it would end up inside a house. Id. at 714-15; see also Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 18 (holding that the government engages in a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment by using a 19 thermal imager to detect heat signatures emanating from inside a house that would be invisible to 20 the naked eye). 21 Most recently, in United States v. Jones, five Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court concluded 22 that prolonged electronic location monitoring by the government, even when limited to public 23 places, infringes on a legitimate expectation of privacy in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 24 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 965 (Alito, J., joined by Ginsburg, 25 Breyer, & Kagan, JJ., concurring in the judgment). In Jones, the government installed a GPS 26 tracking device on the defendant’s car and used it to monitor the car’s location—on public roads— 27 28 13 Case No. 15-XR-90304-HRL-1(LHK) ORDER AFFIRMING DENIAL OF APPLICATION FOR HISTORICAL CELL SITE LOCATION INFORMATION