United States District Court Northern District of California Case5:15-xr-90304-HRL Document30 Filed07/29/15 Page15 of 46 1 monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive record of a person’s public movements that reflects 2 a wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.” Id. 3 Justice Sotomayor was particularly concerned with “the existence of a reasonable societal 4 expectation of privacy in the sum of one’s public movements.” Id. at 956 (emphasis added). In 5 particular, she wondered “whether people reasonably expect that their movements will be recorded 6 and aggregated in a manner that enables the Government to ascertain, more or less at will, their 7 political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.” Id.; see also CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 8 178 (1985) (finding it within the CIA director’s discretion not to disclose “superficially innocuous 9 information” that might reveal an intelligence source’s identity because “what may seem trivial to 10 the uninformed, may appear of great moment to one who has a broad view of the scene and may 11 put the questioned item of information in its proper context” (brackets and internal quotation 12 marks omitted)). When governmental actions intrude upon someone’s privacy to that degree, 13 Justice Sotomayor concluded, a warrant is required. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., 14 concurring). 15 Two years later, the U.S. Supreme Court cited Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in Jones 16 with approval in holding that police must obtain a warrant to search the contents of an arrestee’s 17 cell phone. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2490 (2014). Prior to Riley, the U.S. Supreme 18 Court had adopted a categorical rule that, under the longstanding search-incident-to-arrest 19 exception to the warrant requirement, the police need not obtain a warrant before searching 20 “personal property immediately associated with the person of the arrestee.” Id. at 2484 (ellipsis 21 omitted) (quoting United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977)); see also United States v. 22 Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973). In holding that a warrant was required to search the contents 23 of an arrestee’s cell phone, the Riley Court found that “[c]ell phones differ in both a quantitative 24 and a qualitative sense from other objects that might be kept on an arrestee’s person.” 134 S. Ct. 25 at 2489. In addition to “their immense storage capacity” and “pervasiveness” in American society, 26 cell phones were further distinguished from conventional items an arrestee might be carrying in 27 28 15 Case No. 15-XR-90304-HRL-1(LHK) ORDER AFFIRMING DENIAL OF APPLICATION FOR HISTORICAL CELL SITE LOCATION INFORMATION