Judgment Approved by the court for handing down. DPP v Bussetti on the one hand the fact that he had uploaded a video at all suggested that there were audio and images on it that he wanted his friends to see as otherwise there would have been no reason for him to have uploaded it. On the other, I noted that although the images were clear the sound in the video seen in court was bad. A different video taken at the same time by another person, might be shorter or longer, contain better audio or worse, be without sound or have fewer clear images. It was impossible to say. y. I considered that although the chances were that the video uploaded by the Respondent would have been similar to the one I had seen, because of a lack of evidence on the point, I could not be sure beyond reasonable doubt that the offensive remarks relied on by the Crown would be heard or that the images would be clear enough to be grossly offensive on a different video.” The law 21. Mr John McGuinness QC for the DPP accepts that this court is not entitled to allow an appeal by case stated simply because we take a different view of the facts from that of the Magistrates’ Court. He submits that the Chief Magistrate’s determination that without seeing the video taken by Mr Bussetti she could not be sure that it was similar in content to the one played in court was not reasonably open to her to reach. He relies on the contents of the admissions, the agreed summary of the Respondent’s interview under caution on 6 November 2018 and the video itself. He submits that the test set out by Lord Radcliffe in Edwards v Bairstow [1956] AC 14 at 36 is amply satisfied. 22. Section 127(1)(a) of the Communications Act 2003 states, so far as relevant, that a person is guilty of an offence if he “sends by means of a public electronic communications network a message or other matter that is grossly offensive”. 23. The leading case is the decision of the House of Lords in Director of Public Prosecutions v Collins [2006] 1 WLR 2223. The defendant telephoned his MP a number of times and spoke either directly to him or to members of his staff or left messages on an answering machine. In those conversations and messages the defendant referred to “wogs”, “Pakis”, “black bastards” and “niggers”. None of the people to whom he spoke on the telephone or who picked up the recorded messages was a member of an ethnic minority. The justices held that although the conversations and messages were offensive, a reasonable person would not have found them grossly offensive, and acquitted the defendant. This court dismissed the prosecution’s appeal by way of case stated. 24. The House of Lords allowed the prosecution’s further appeal. In the leading speech Lord Bingham of Cornhill, with whom all the other Law Lords agreed, said:7. This brief summary of the relevant legislation suggests two conclusions. First, the object of section 127(1)(a) and its predecessor sections is not to protect people against receipt of unsolicited messages which they may find seriously objectionable. That object is addressed in section 1 of the