that the university should be precluded from providing such information if the circumstances of the situation precluded a written request in advance. 37. I also accept Mr Knight’s further argument that in any event the loss that the claimant relies upon, namely his arrest, was not caused by the disclosure made by the university. He was arrested at his Loughborough home. The address of his Loughborough home was given to the police by the informant. Whether or not there had been a disclosure by the university, that loss would still have taken place. 38. I also reject as having no realistic prospect of success, Mr Masters’ alternative formulation based on misrepresentation or breach of trust. It seems to me that those are simply unarguable if, as I have concluded, there is no claim for breach of contract. His claim that there may have been a conspiracy also falls if there was no breach of the Data Protection Act and if, as I hold, there was no breach of contract. 39. In his application notice the claimant also seeks to make Roger Kennedy and William Spinks additional defendants. They were officials of the university at the time, although they are no longer or employees of the university currently. They were involved, one way or another in the disclosure of the claimant’s information to the police. 40. Mr Knight made submissions as to why I should not accede to that application. It seems to me that there is a short answer to it, given the conclusion which I have reached as far as the university is concerned. Since I conclude that there is no realistic prospect of the claim against the university succeeding, it seems to me that there could be no possible justification in now making Mr Kennedy and Mr Spinks additional defendants. 41. I have considered this application at some length and indeed, Mr Masters and Mr Knight had a rather more extensive opportunity to make oral submissions to me than would be normal on an application for permission to appeal, still less on an application for the exercise of the exception jurisdiction in Rule 52.17. I have though, thought it right to do that in view of the fact that some at least of the evidence before Master Yoxall is now accepted to have been incorrect. 42. Nonetheless, having heard the submissions of counsel I have come to the clear conclusion that the application to re-open the application for permission to appeal should be refused. I say in any event I would have refused the application for permission to appeal had that been a live matter before me and that is sufficient to deal with the application.