UNITED STATES V. MOHAMUD 43 For these reasons, and because the target of the surveillance was a non-U.S. person located outside of the United States at the time of the surveillance, the government was not required to obtain a search warrant to collect Mohamud’s email communications with the overseas foreign national as an incident to its lawful search of the foreign national’s email.25 b. Collection of Mohamud’s Emails was Reasonable Assuming that Mohamud had a Fourth Amendment right in the incidentally collected communications, the search at issue was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.26 “Even if a warrant is not required, a search is not beyond Fourth Amendment scrutiny; for it must be reasonable in its scope and manner of execution.” Maryland v. King, 133 S. 25 Because the incidental collection excepts this search from the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, we need not address any “foreign intelligence exception.” 26 It is unclear whether Mohamud had a right to bar use of these incidentally-collected communications in evidence against him on the basis that the communications were seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Commentators suggest that he does, so we will assume that here. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and the Global Internet, 67 Stan. L. Rev. 285, 313–14 (2015) (“Communicating with a person who lacks Fourth Amendment rights should not waive the rights of the person who has those rights. The Fourth Amendment should continue to fully protect the U.S. person who communicates with those lacking Fourth Amendment rights.”); PCLOB Report at 94 (“The government has acknowledged that the Fourth Amendment rights of U.S. persons are affected when their communications are acquired under Section 702 incidentally or otherwise[.]”).