32 UNITED STATES V. MOHAMUD government conduct set out in Black favor dismissal of the indictment.16 We disagree. In Cromitie, a comparable Second Circuit case, the defendant was convicted of planning and attempting to carry out domestic terrorism offenses. 727 F.3d at 199–204. The defendant claimed that the government’s conduct in persuading him to commit the charged offenses violated due process. Id. at 217. The Second Circuit held that it did not. Even though the government “invented all of the details of the scheme,” the defendant’s express desire to “do something to America” and “die like a martyr” was sufficient to justify the government’s testing of how far he would go. Id. at 219. Like Mohamud, Cromitie argued that the government took advantage of his religious affiliation, but the court explained that a government agent “is entitled to probe the attitudes” of an individual who “volunteers that he wants to ‘do something to America’ . . . to learn whether his religious views have impelled him toward the violent brand of radical Islam that poses a dire threat to the United States.” Id. at 219–20. 16 These factors are analyzed collectively in determining whether government conduct is outrageous: “(1) known criminal characteristics of the defendants; (2) individualized suspicion of the defendants; (3) the government’s role in creating the crime of conviction; (4) the government’s encouragement of the defendants to commit the offense conduct; (5) the nature of the government’s participation in the offense conduct; and (6) the nature of the crime being pursued and necessity for the actions taken in light of the nature of the criminal enterprise at issue.” Black, 733 F.3d at 303. The first three are relevant to how the government set up the sting, the fourth and fifth analyze the government’s role in the sting, and the last relates to the justification for the operation. Id. at 303–04.