Case 5:17-cv-06064-LHK Document 54 Filed 03/26/18 Page 13 of 27 1 circumstances can private property be treated as though it were public? The answer that Marsh 2 gives is when that property has taken on all the attributes of a town, i.e., ‘residential buildings, 3 streets, a system of sewers, a sewage disposal plant and a business block on which business places 4 are situated.’” Id. (quoting Marsh, 326 U.S. at 502). Justice Black further argued that “nothing in 5 Marsh [] indicates that if one these features is present, e.g., a business district, this is sufficient for 6 the Court to confiscate a part of an owner’s private property and give its use to people who want to 7 picket on it.” Id. In Justice Black’s view, Marsh “dealt with the very special situation of a 8 company-owned town” and “was never intended to apply” outside of that context. Id. at 330. United States District Court Northern District of California 9 It took the United States Supreme Court all of eight years to explicitly overturn its holding 10 in Logan Valley and adopt Justice Black’s dissent. First, four years after Logan Valley, in Lloyd 11 Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972), the Supreme Court addressed a situation that was very 12 similar to Logan Valley and held that a privately owned shopping center could prohibit anti- 13 Vietnam War protestors from distributing literature in the shopping center because it was not a 14 state actor that was required to comply with the First Amendment. Id. at 570. In reaching this 15 holding, the Supreme Court quoted Justice Black’s assertion in his Logan Valley dissent that 16 Marsh “‘was never intended to apply’” outside “‘the very special situation of a company-owned 17 town.’” Id. at 562–63 (quoting Marsh, 326 U.S. at 502). Further, the Supreme Court 18 distinguished Marsh and rejected the argument that because the shopping center had “sidewalks, 19 streets, and parking areas which are functionally similar to facilities customarily provided by 20 municipalities,” “all members of the public, whether invited as customers or not, have the same 21 right of free speech [in the shopping center] as they would have on the similar public facilities in 22 the streets of a city or town.” Id. at 569. Specifically, the Lloyd Court observed that Marsh 23 “involved the assumption by a private enterprise of all of the attributes of a state-created 24 municipality and the exercise by that enterprise of semiofficial municipal functions as a delegate 25 of the State,” such that “the owner of the company town was performing the full spectrum of 26 municipal powers and stood in the shoes of the State.” Id. The Lloyd Court then explained that 27 28 13 Case No. 17-CV-06064-LHK ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S FEDERAL CAUSES OF ACTION; DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S STATE LAW CAUSES OF ACTION; AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION