4 HB 129-16 HC 1250-16 Subsection (4) of that section which is of peremptory application makes it clear that the Vice Chancellor shall not expel a student for misconduct unless the student has been found guilty of misconduct by the Student Disciplinary Committee in terms of s27, while subsection (5) requires any decision of the Vice Chancellor made in terms of subsection (3) to be ratified by the University Council. We have not been told if such ratification was done. Mr Jaravaza, who appeared for the respondents, raised three points in limine. The first one is that the matter is not urgent because the applicants have created the urgency. They received the suspension letters on 22 April 2016 and did not do anything about them until doomsday on 18 May 2016, 26 days later, when they filed this application. I do not agree. This is a matter in which the first respondent exercised his power to suspend the applicants in terms of s 8(3) (d) of the Act, a section which allows him to suspend for an indefinite period. It cannot be said that the need to act arose on 22 April 2016 because the suspension was done pending the convening of a student’s disciplinary committee. Up to now that committee has not been convened and on the face of it, one cannot say that the first respondent has acted outside his powers. In fact it is the failure of the respondents act which is the source of disquiet and has led to a complaint being made against the failure of administrative justice as provided for in s3(1) of the Administrative Justice Act as read with s68 (1) of the constitution. The challenge brought by the applicants centres around the delay in convening a disciplinary hearing until the examinations time arrived. The respondents are seeking to rely on their own default to deprive the applicants a remedy, suggesting that the applicants have created the urgency. While it is true that the applicants could have come to court earlier in the circumstances, it is a matter in which I am prepared to overlook that delay because the respondents contributed to it. In any event, I have mentioned before that litigants appear to have unduly blown the question of self-created urgency out of proportion and attempted to give it a meaning which authorities have not assigned to it. Courts of law have always appreciate that litigants do not eat, move and have their being in filing court process, if one may be allowed to borrow biblical language. They have other things to attend to and in a case such as the present where the respondents are the ones who have failed to act timeously they cannot use that against the applicants. See The National Prosecuting