No. 14-5123 Huff, et al. v. Spaw Page 17 had held that § 605 interception requires interference, we could not rely on that holding to define the meaning of “interception” under a different statute. We must instead look to Title III’s text, which undermines Spaw’s position because the statutory definition for interception contains no reference to an interference requirement. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4). The statute goes on to state that it is unlawful to intentionally intercept oral communications under a variety of conditions, including through the use of a “device [that] transmits communication by radio, or interferes with the transmission of such communication.” Id. § 2511(1)(b)(ii) (emphasis added). The disjunctive use of “or” indicates that Title III contemplates using a radio device that does not interfere with radio transmissions to unlawfully intercept oral communications. Case law also contradicts Spaw’s interference requirement. In Boddie, we held that covertly recording a faceto-face conversation could be the basis for unlawful interception under Title III, 731 F.2d at 339, and the Seventh Circuit reached the same conclusion in McCann, 622 F.3d at 752–53. In neither case did the defendant “interfere” with a line of communication. Because Spaw cites non-binding and unpersuasive case law to support a conclusion that is inconsistent with statutory text and binding case law, we reject her argument that her conduct did not qualify as interception because she did not interfere with the phone line. V. CONCLUSION James Huff’s statements do not qualify as oral communications for Title III purposes because he exposed them to Spaw when he pocket-dialed her, but Bertha Huff’s statements do qualify because she cannot be held responsible for her husband’s pocket-dial. While Spaw intercepted Bertha Huff’s oral communications, the question remains as to whether she did so intentionally through use of a device. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment as to James Huff, REVERSE the district court’s judgment as to Bertha Huff, and REMAND for further consideration consistent with this opinion. consent because that section provides that “[i]t shall not be unlawful for a person acting under color of law to intercept a wire, oral or electronic communication, where . . . one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception.” (Emphasis added).