Rodriguez v. Google LLC 20-cv-04688-RS (N.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2024) treatment because device-level settings presumably apply uniformly across all iOS devices or all Android devices. Further, summary adjudication, not class certification, is the appropriate vehicle by which to resolve how device-level settings may interact with sWAA. Google's last argument focuses on users who had accounts prior to 2016. It asserts that, prior to that date, sWAA was “off by default” for accounts. It insists that the challenge will be in separating which members did not change their settings by default and which did not do so by choice, raising individualized inquiries. Plaintiffs rely on two expert opinions to refute Google's contention. Plaintiffs point out that pre-2016 users received a “consent bump” prompt, by “which Google urged them to turn sWAA on.” Reply at 14-15. This conduct matches the conduct post-2016, as all users collectively switched sWAA off. In other words, the users who did not turn sWAA on effectively refused data collection by Google. While Google points out that it may have to raise different defenses with respect to the pre-2016 users, these defenses need not be individualized and may apply as a whole to pre-2016 users and post-2016 users, such that the issue may be resolved through sub-classing if necessary. See Tyson Foods, Inc., 577 U.S. at 453-54. ii. Third-party disclosures Google argues that that each class members “was subjected to dozens, perhaps hundreds, of disclosures from apps informing them that their activity data on third party apps was being collected.” Opp. at 23. Google suggests that, as a result, a factfinder will have to sift through “each innumerable permutations of apps the user has downloaded” to conduct a consent inquiry. However, the relevant question concerns Google's disclosures about the sWAA button, not thirdparty disclosures to users. To the extent Google had a policy that required third party apps to disclose Google's policies to users, that evidence may be applied across the class. Google is correct 18 that a factfinder may have to analyze an app's specific disclosures to evaluate consent but *18 that individual inquiry, if applicable, does not overwhelm predominating questions as to Google's privacy disclosures. The predominance inquiry of 23(b)(3) is therefore satisfied. Additionally, class treatment of this case is the “superior” method of adjudication because each class member would not have to “litigate numerous and substantial issues to establish his or her right to recover individually.” Zinser, 253 F.3d at 1192. For these reasons, the motion to certify a damages class under 23(b)(3) is granted. III. 23(b)(2) Plaintiffs also seek certification under 23(b)(2) for injunctive relief from Google's alleged misconduct class-wide. “Rule 23(b)(2) applies only when a single injunction or declaratory judgment would provide relief to each member of the class.” Dukes, 564 U.S. at 360. Unlike 23(b)(3), the relevant inquiry here is not whether common questions predominate in the individual claims of proposed class members, “but rather whether [the defendant] has engaged in a “common policy'” with respect to the class. Yahoo Mail Litig., 308 F.R.D. at 599. Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief: (1) precluding Google from further collecting, storing, and using consumers' (s)WAA-off app activity data; (2) requiring Google to delete already collected (s)WAA-off app activity data; (3) requiring Google to delete any products, services, or algorithms built in whole or in part with that unlawfully collected (s)WAA-off app activity data; and (4) appointing an independent third party to verify that the injunctive relief has been (and continues to be) implemented. Class Cert. Mot. at 25. Google argues that none of these requests address any “common policy” by Google. Plaintiffs' second request would, 11