- 29 A B A where, when a person has been lawfully arrested under section 50, the B police officer “may reasonably suspect” (as the standard now laid down C D by the provision) such an urgent search may (a) prevent an imminent threat to safety of the public or police officers, (b) prevent imminent loss C D or destruction of evidence, and (c) lead to the discovery of evidence in E E extremely urgent and vulnerable situation. F F 65. G H The court notes Mr McCoy’s submissions that, other than meeting the proportionality test, the warrantless search power provided under section 50(6) must also comply with the protection under BL30, G H which emphasizes the requirement of compliance of “legal procedures” I J for any invasion or interference of private communication even for law enforcement purposes.11 Leading counsel contends that section 50(6) I J does not expressly provide any procedures to regulate a warrantless K L search for mobile phone private information and data. Any power so given must still be unconstitutional. Mr McCoy hence submits that any K L search for the digital information in or through a seized mobile phone can M M only be lawfully performed under a specific warrant.12 N O N 66. With respect, I am unable to agree. The exigent O circumstances requirement for the exercise of the power of a warrantless P Q search in relation to mobile phone digital content is part of the common law prerequisite, this would therefore satisfy BL30’s requirement that the P Q infringement on privacy of communication is done in accordance with R S R 11 T 12 in relation to mobile phone contents is contrary to the express words or the clear intention of section 50(6) as identified above. See: Koo Sze Yiu v Chief Executive of HKSAR (2006) 9 HKCFAR 441 at paragraph 3, per Bokhary PJ (as the learned NPJ then was); Leung Kwok Hung v Chief Executive of HKSAR (HCAL 107/2005, 9 February 2006) at paragraphs 120 - 127 and 182 - 184, per Hartmann J. These submissions are shared and relied on by Mr Albert Wong and Mr Pun. S T U U V V