05/02/2020 Galloway v Frazer & Ors [2016] NIQB 7 (27 January 2016) of leave. This approach by Hoffmann J has been approved in a number of subsequent decisions, including those in the Court of Appeal in England and Wales e.g. see Erste Group Bank AG v JSC "VMZ Red October" and Others [2015] EWCA Civ 379 at [44]-[45]. I propose to approach this application in the manner recommended by Hofmann J. INJUNCTION GATEWAY [54] There are three claims for injunctions. They relate to the content of a schedule attached to the statement of claim. The contents of the schedule appear to comprise of complete transcripts of videos URL2, URL3 and URL 4. The injunctions cannot be understood, much less complied with unless the content of the schedule is known. In respect of URL1 the plaintiff has chosen not to set out its contents at all. Further there is no suggestion that Goggle intends to republish URL1 at any time. URL2 has been denied to viewers in Northern Ireland from 18 September 2014 and has since taken down completely. There is no suggestion that there is any risk of it being republished. [55] This leaves URL3 and URL4. As I have stated it is clear that URL3 and URL4 were not included in the original writ of summons given the nature of the application made for the injunction on 9 September 2014 and the grounding affidavit to that application. This is further confirmed by the correspondence at that time because no complaint was made by the plaintiff or his legal team about URL3 or URL4 before the application for leave to serve out. They are very much an afterthought and that is why they are only referred to in what can best be described as an elliptical manner in the draft statement of claim which accompanied the application for leave under Order 11 before Stephens J. [56] There is a good arguable case at this stage, and I stress at this stage, that if material defamatory of the plaintiff is published on YouTube or other unlawful acts are committed by YouTube, then Google must act with reasonable expedition to remove that material or else be found for it. This issue will be examined in rather more detail when the "tort gateway" is analysed. [57] However there is no realistic prospect of any court granting any injunction in the terms sought by the plaintiff. (i) The first injunction seeks to prevent Google from harassing the plaintiffs (sic) "by, inter alia, publishing any information on the internet" without specifying the nature of that information. If such an injunction was granted then that would result in a breach of, inter alia, Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. There is no prospect of such an injunction being granted. It is far too wide and ill-defined. The injunction sought also requires Google to "remove contents specified within the schedule hereto". The schedule includes URL2, URL3 and URL4. While the plaintiff wants URL2 in its entirety removed because it is an ad hominem attack on a plaintiff, much of URL3 and URL4 is unobjectionable. Nowhere does the plaintiff seek to define what part of the publication(s) is required to be removed. Again there is no prospect of such a wide and ill-defined injunction being granted. (ii) A second injunction seeks an order restraining Google from publishing libels relating to the plaintiff, without specifying what those libels are. It also seeks to have the "Defendant to remove contents (sic) specified within the schedule attached hereto". This is hopelessly imprecise and again there is no realistic prospect of any injunction being granted in such terms. (iii) Finally an injunction is sought "contra mundum" and refers to republication of the contents specified in the schedule. Not only is an injunction in such terms objectionable for the reasons which I have previously set out, but it also fails to take into account that this court, as I have stated earlier, has no power to restrain publications outside the jurisdiction: see Diamond v Sutton [1866] LR 1 XCH 130. Accordingly in those circumstances I conclude that the injunction gateway is closed to the plaintiff. THE NECESSARY OR PROPER PARTY GATEWAY [58] It is a precondition of leave to serve out of the jurisdiction under this ground that another defendant has already been served within or without the jurisdiction. In this case it has been satisfied file:///Users/nerissa/Downloads/Columbia CSV/Galloway v Frazer & Ors [2016] NIQB 7 (27 January 2016).htm 16/26