05/02/2020 Galloway v Frazer & Ors [2016] NIQB 7 (27 January 2016) any right thinking member of Northern Ireland's society would view such accusations of supporting terrorism to be the most serious of libels. These claims most certainly convey defamatory imputations. Accordingly I conclude that the defence of vulgar abuse is likely to fail. However, it will be for the trial judge (and/or jury) ultimately to reach a concluded view on this issue. [70] It follows from the above that the court is satisfied that the plaintiff can avail of the tort gateway in respect of the claim for libel for URL2 because there is a good arguable case for that gateway, there is a serious issue to be tried and Northern Ireland is the proper place in which to bring this claim. For the avoidance of doubt, although I would refuse permission in respect of URL3 and URL4 for material non-disclosure, I do not consider that the tests have been satisfied in respect of them. There is no satisfactory evidence of downloading in Northern Ireland and given the nature of the allegations contained in those videos, Google did act with reasonable expedition. MISUSE OF PRIVATE INFORMATION [71] There had been no cause of action for invasion of privacy in the common law of Northern Ireland. However, the landscape changed with the passing of the Human Rights Act 1998 ("HRA") which came into force on 2 October 2000 and the protection offered by Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights ("ECHR"). The House of Lords in Campbell v MGN Limited [2004] UKHL 22 devised a new cause of action, which it called "Misuse of Private Information" or "The unjustified use of Private Information". This covered the publication of information in which a plaintiff had a "reasonable expectation of privacy": see Campbell v MGN Limited at [51] and [134]. [72] The plaintiff is a public figure, a controversial politician, who is often in the spotlight. He complains about the views attributed to him by the first defendant in these videos which were posted on YouTube. However, by no stretch of the imagination could it be said that in some way the plaintiff has an expectation of privacy on the issues raised in these videos and in particular his attitude to terrorism. It is to the plaintiff's immense credit that he is always prepared to challenge and does so challenge his detractors in open debate. His critics claim that his views amount to support for terrorism. He is emphatic that they do not. His real complaint is that his position has been either wilfully or carelessly misrepresented on these issues and his reputation traduced as a consequence. The thrust of the plaintiff's complaint has always been libel, namely that his views have been wilfully misrepresented by his opponents, including the defendant, not that his views on these highly topical issues should remain private. [73] In Murray v Express Newspapers PLC [2008] EWCA Civ 446 the Court of Appeal said in respect of the question whether there is "a reasonable expectation of privacy" in respect of the information in question as follows: "As we see it, the question where there is a reasonable expectation of privacy is a broad one, which takes account of all the circumstances of the case. They include the attributes of the claimant, the nature of the activity in which the claimant was engaged, the place in which it was happening, the nature and purpose of the intrusion, the absence of consent and whether it was known or could be inferred, the effect on the claimant and the circumstances in which and the purposes for which the information came into the hands of the publisher." [74] Accordingly in respect of URL2 I do not consider that a claim for misuse of private information has any prospect of success whatsoever. Although I would not permit service out for URL3 and URL4 for reasons of non-disclosure, I do not consider that any claims for misuse of private information in respect of these two videos have any prospect of success either. (ii) Data Protection Act 1998 [75] The plaintiff makes some general claims that there have breaches of the Data Protection Act in the amended writ of summons. The draft statement of claim before Stephens J failed to allege what data protection principle had been breached. Indeed the complaints made by the Court of Sessions in Lyons v Chief Constable of Strathclyde [2013] LLR 748 at [27] seem apposite: file:///Users/nerissa/Downloads/Columbia CSV/Galloway v Frazer & Ors [2016] NIQB 7 (27 January 2016).htm 20/26