6 YOUTH INITIATIVE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS v. SERBIA JUDGMENT to that of the press (Animal Defenders International v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 48876/08, § 103, 22 April 2013). The applicant’s activities thus warrant similar Convention protection to that afforded to the press (see Társaság a Szabadságjogokért, cited above, § 27). Accordingly, the Government’s remaining objections must also be rejected. 21. As this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention and it is not inadmissible on any other grounds, it must be declared admissible. B. Merits 22. The applicant submitted that the refusal of the intelligence agency to provide it with information as to the use of electronic surveillance measures had adversely affected its ability to exercise its role as a public watchdog, in breach of Article 10 of the Convention. 23. The Government claimed that the intelligence agency did not hold the information requested (they referred to the intelligence agency’s letter of 23 September 2008 mentioned in paragraph 10 above). They added that freedom to receive information merely prohibited a State from restricting a person from receiving information that others wished or might be willing to impart to him; that freedom could not be construed as imposing on a State, in the circumstances of the present case, positive obligations to collect and disseminate information of its own motion (see Guerra and Others v. Italy, 19 February 1998, § 53, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-I). 24. The Court notes that the applicant requested the intelligence agency to provide it with some factual information concerning the use of electronic surveillance measures. The agency first refused the request, relying thereby on the statutory provision applicable to secret information. After an order by the Information Commissioner that the information at issue be nevertheless disclosed, the intelligence agency notified the applicant that it did not hold that information. As the applicant was obviously involved in the legitimate gathering of information of public interest with the intention of imparting that information to the public and thereby contributing to the public debate, there has been an interference with its right to freedom of expression (see, by analogy, Társaság a Szabadságjogokért, cited above, § 28, and Kenedi v. Hungary, no. 31475/05, § 43, 26 May 2009). 25. The exercise of freedom of expression may be subject to restrictions, but any such restrictions ought to be in accordance with domestic law. The Court finds that the restrictions imposed by the intelligence agency in the present case did not meet that criterion. The domestic body set up precisely to ensure the observance of the Freedom of Information Act 2004 examined the case and decided that the information sought had to be provided to the applicant. It is true that the intelligence agency eventually responded that it did not hold that information, but that response is unpersuasive in view of