CENTRUM FÖR RÄTTVISA v. SWEDEN JUDGMENT 33 “interference” to what is “necessary in a democratic society” (Roman Zakharov, § 232). 105. Review and supervision of secret surveillance measures may come into play at three stages: when the surveillance is first ordered, while it is being carried out, or after it has been terminated. As regards the first two stages, the very nature and logic of secret surveillance dictate that not only the surveillance itself but also the accompanying review should be effected without the individual’s knowledge. Consequently, since the individual will necessarily be prevented from seeking an effective remedy of his or her own accord or from taking a direct part in any review proceedings, it is essential that the procedures established should themselves provide adequate and equivalent guarantees safeguarding his or her rights. In addition, the values of a democratic society must be followed as faithfully as possible in the supervisory procedures if the bounds of necessity, within the meaning of Article 8 § 2, are not to be exceeded. In a field where abuse is potentially so easy in individual cases and could have such harmful consequences for democratic society as a whole, it is in principle desirable to entrust supervisory control to a judge, judicial control normally offering the best guarantees of independence, impartiality and a proper procedure (Roman Zakharov, § 233). 106. As regards the third stage, after the surveillance has been terminated, the question of subsequent notification of surveillance measures is inextricably linked to the effectiveness of remedies and hence to the existence of effective safeguards against the abuse of monitoring powers. There is in principle little scope for recourse to a remedy by the individual concerned unless he or she is advised of the measures taken without his or her knowledge and thus able to challenge their legality retrospectively or, in the alternative, that any person who suspects that his or her communications are being or have been intercepted can apply to an appropriate body, so that the latter’s jurisdiction does not depend on a notification having been given to the subject who has had communications intercepted (Roman Zakharov, § 234). 107. Having found an interference of the applicant’s rights under Article 8 § 1, in examining the justification for the interference under Article 8 § 2, the Court needs to determine whether the contested legislation itself is in conformity with the Convention (Roman Zakharov, § 235). In cases where the legislation permitting secret surveillance is contested, the matter of the lawfulness of the interference is closely related to the question whether the “necessity” requirement has been complied with and it is therefore appropriate to address these two issues jointly. The “quality of law” in this sense implies that the domestic law must not only be accessible and foreseeable in its application, but must also ensure that secret surveillance measures are applied only when “necessary in a democratic