CENTRUM FÖR RÄTTVISA v. SWEDEN JUDGMENT 41 considers that what is essential for the protection of individuals’ rights in the context of the regime under consideration is that the FRA’s signals intelligence is subject to a system of prior authorisation whereby the FRA must submit for independent examination an application for a permit to conduct surveillance in respect of each intelligence collection mission. As an additional safeguard against abuse and arbitrariness, the task of examining whether the mission is compatible with applicable legislation and whether the intelligence collection is proportional to the resultant interference with personal integrity has been entrusted to a body whose presiding members are or have been judges. Furthermore, the supervision of the Foreign Intelligence Court is extensive as the FRA, in its applications, must specify not only the mission request in question and the need for the intelligence sought but also the signal carriers to which access is needed and the search terms – or at least the categories of search terms – that will be used (see paragraphs 18-20 above). The Court therefore considers that the judicial supervision performed by the Foreign Intelligence Court is of crucial importance in that it limits the FRA’s discretion by interpreting the scope of mandating and performing signals intelligence. 140. As a final point under this heading, it should be noted that the FRA itself may decide to grant a permit, if it is feared that the application of a permit from the Foreign Intelligence Court might cause delay or other inconveniences of essential importance for one of the specified purposes of the signals intelligence. In this context the Court reiterates the need for safeguards to ensure that such emergency measures are used sparingly and only in justified cases (Roman Zakharov, cited above, § 266). As the legislation states that such a decision must be followed by an immediate notification to and a subsequent rapid review by the Foreign Intelligence Court where the permit may be changed or revoked, the Court finds this procedure acceptable (cf. Szabó and Vissy, cited above, § 81). 141. In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that the provisions and procedures relating to the system of prior court authorisation, on the whole, provide important guarantees against abuse. (v) Procedures to be followed for storing, accessing, examining, using and destroying the intercepted data (α) The parties’ submissions 142. The applicant argued that the procedures in these aspects were regulated in only very broad terms. For example, there was no general obligation to destroy data. 143. The Government pointed out that the Foreign Intelligence Inspectorate was responsible for scrutinising the treatment and destruction of data in general and had a mandate to terminate surveillance and order the