marks containing a common element appears to me to be an extraneous matter. It is, however, not necessary to reach a final decision on this aspect because the concept of a series of marks cannot arise in the present instance. There is no series in use belonging to the appellant, and furthermore, the prefix in casu is not very distinctive but is, rather, descriptive. Had the prefix been non-descriptive and borne a high degree of distinctiveness there might have been merit in counsel's submission." View These views, at the very least, accord with the practice adopted by the [1979] RPC 330) and with the general approach favoured by Corbett JA. [18] Page British Registry Parallel (Semigres Citation Trade Mark The premise of the respondent's argument is that the main object of section 17(1) is consumer protection and only indirectly the protection of registered trade marks. I disagree. Consumer protection is primarily catered for by section 16(1) and registered monopolies by section 17(1). Registration of the appellant's mark would provide an absolute defence against an infringement action based upon the respondent's earlier marks. To prevent that eventuality where the second mark is confusingly similar to an earlier mark as registered is the reason why section 17(1) was enacted. The further argument is that since, as a general rule, the singular includes the plural, section 17(1) prohibits also the registration of a trade mark if it resembles "trade marks belonging to a different proprietor". But if one extrapolates the argument that the singular includes the plural, it would mean that trade marks belonging to different proprietors could form part of the series. That identifies another problem. The respondent's 250 of [2001] 4 All SA 242 (A) rks are not associated and that means that they can be assigned individually to different proprietors. The fact that they belong to one proprietor is fortuitous and transient. The series argument might have had some merit had the marks been associated. I have in any event a conceptual difficulty. If A does not resemble B, C or D individually, I fail to understand how it can resemble them collectively. [19] In the result the appeal must succeed with costs. All that remains is the costs of the condonation. It would have been unnecessary had the appellant accepted the respondent's also have been unnecessary had the respondent not taken the incorrect view that it could not to the late filing of the notice of appeal. Taking a broad approach, it seems to me that justice no costs order is made in relation thereto. [20] The order is consequently: (a) The condonation (b) The appeal (c) The two order of the court a quo is amended counsel." (Nienaber, Navsa application is upheld JJA, Melunsky with and is granted. costs, including the costs of two to read: Nugent AJJA concurred "The For the O Salmon SC and B Du Plessis instructed by John & Kernick, respondent: instructed by Spoor & Fisher, Centurion counsel. appeal is dismissed in the judgment For the applicant: L Bowman application for advice. It would have consented will be served if Pretoria of Harms with JA.) costs, including the costs of