CCPR/C/139/D/3252/2018 and to inform public opinion. It constitutes one of the cornerstones of a democratic society (para. 13). 8.4 Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Committee notes the State party’s argument that the judgments of the domestic courts were based on the relevant provisions of Kyrgyz legislation, and their application pursued the legitimate aim of the protection of the reputation or rights of others, namely the then President. The Committee also notes that according to the author, the restriction imposed on her was not provided for by law and was neither necessary in a democratic society, nor proportionate to the aim pursued. Even assuming the restriction was provided for by law, as argued by the State party, the Committee would have to decide whether the restriction on the author’s right to freedom of expression was necessary and proportionate. 8.5 In circumstances of public debate concerning public figures in the political domain and public institutions, the value placed by the Covenant upon uninhibited expression is particularly high. All public figures, including those exercising the highest political authority such as heads of State, are legitimately subject to criticism and political opposition.7 In the present case, however, the domestic courts relied extensively on the negative portrayal of the President in the article to justify the restriction on the author’s rights. According to the author, that conclusion was drawn entirely from the findings of the linguistics expert, which focused mainly on Ms. D.’s speech, but did not evaluate the content of the article itself. It is also apparent that the courts did not attempt to conduct their own legal analysis of the article in question. In particular, their judgments did not specify which passages of the article were deemed problematic or how they affected the President’s honour and reputation. Although the courts reproduced the expert assessment that Ms. D.’s speech contained expressions degrading to the President’s honour, they did not quote any such expressions from the article. 8.6 Furthermore, the Committee observes that the courts failed to consider thoroughly all the circumstances of the case and to give due weight to the respective status of the former President and the author, as well as to the content of the publication. First, the author as a journalist was sanctioned for disseminating the statements of another person, including with edits.8 Although the appellate court noted that some statements had been distorted, it did not specify how they had been modified or whether the modifications had changed their original meaning. Notwithstanding this, it transpires from the judgments that the courts proceeded from the fact that the article merely disseminated the statements by Ms. D. that the court found untrue and offensive. The domestic courts did not, however, adduce any reasons for taking adverse actions 9 against a journalist for reporting on matters of public interest by disseminating the statements of another person.10 At the same time, the courts failed to assess the context of the publication, its nature and wording, its contribution to the public debate 11 and the fact that a head of State should tolerate higher levels of criticism than a private individual.12 Furthermore, the courts did not evaluate the impact on the author of the imposed restrictions, the hefty amount of non-pecuniary damages imposed by the court and the obligation to remove the article from the website, thus failing to weigh the rights of the author against those of the plaintiff. 8.7 Lastly, the Committee disagrees with the State party’s objection that the waiver of non-pecuniary damages by the former President rendered the decisions of the domestic courts devoid of any legal consequences. Even though the proceedings against the author were formally civil, the hefty amount of non-pecuniary damages clearly indicates the punitive nature of the measure applied. In that regard the Committee notes that in 2011, Kyrgyz legislators decriminalized libel, aligning the Criminal Code with the Constitution, which 7 8 9 10 11 12 6 Marques de Morais v. Angola. (CCPR/C/83/D/1128/2002), para. 6.8, and European Court of Human Rights, Lingens v. Austria, Application No.9815/82, Judgment, 8 July 1986, para. 42. European Court of Human Rights, Index.hu Zrt v. Hungary, Application No. 77940/17, Judgment, 7 September 2023, para. 26. General comment No 34 (2011), para. 45. See, mutatis mutandis, European Court of Human Rights, Jersild v. Denmark, Application No. 15890/89, Judgment, 23 September 1994, para. 35. General comment No 34 (2011), para. 47. Ibid., para. 38. GE.23-25064