VLADIMIR KHARITONOV v. RUSSIA JUDGMENT to the Integrated Register if they refuse to do so or fail to respond. However, the law did not require Roskomnadzor to check whether that address was used by more than one website or to establish the need for blocking by IP address. That manner of proceeding could, and did in the circumstances of the present case, have the practical effect of extending the scope of the blocking order far beyond the illegal content which had been originally targeted (see Ahmet Yıldırım, cited above, § 63). In fact, as the applicant and third-party interveners pointed out, millions of websites have remained blocked in Russia for the sole reason that they shared an IP address with some other websites featuring illegal content (see paragraphs 23 and 31 above). 42. Shared hosting is a common and accessible hosting arrangement for small to medium-sized websites. However, owners of individual sites, such as the applicant, may not be aware of the contents of co-hosted websites, while the hosting service provider – in this case a company outside the Russian jurisdiction – is not bound by Russian authorities’ determination of illegal content. Whichever shared-hosting platform solution the applicant were to choose, he would incur the risk that the Russian authorities would declare illegal some content of co-hosted websites and that the owners of such websites and the hosting service provider would not heed their take-down orders. Russian law does not require the applicant to control the content of co-hosted websites or the hosting service provider’s compliance with take-down orders. Yet, because of the great latitude the law afforded to Roskomnadzor in blocking matters, the applicant had to bear the consequences of the authorities’ blocking decision merely on account of an incidental connection, at the infrastructure level, between his website and someone else’s illegal content. In such circumstances, the Court cannot find that the law is sufficiently foreseeable in its effects and affords the applicant the opportunity to regulate his conduct. 43. Turning next to the issue of safeguards against abuse which domestic legislation must provide in respect of incidental blocking measures, the Court reiterates that the exercise of powers to interfere with the right to impart information must be clearly circumscribed to minimise the impact of such measures on the accessibility of the Internet. In the instant case, Roskomnadzor gave effect to a decision by which a drug-control agency had determined the content of the offending website to be illegal. Both the original determination and Roskomnadzor’s implementing orders had been made without any advance notification to the parties whose rights and interests were likely to be affected. The blocking measures had not been sanctioned by a court or other independent adjudicatory body providing a forum in which the interested parties could have been heard. Nor did the Russian law call for any impact assessment of the blocking measure prior to its implementation. The Government acknowledged that Roskomnadzor was not legally required to identify the potential collateral effects of 13