10 ELONIS v. UNITED STATES THOMAS, J., dissenting that a §875(c) conviction cannot stand if the defendant’s subjective belief of what constitutes a “threat” differs from that of a reasonable jury. That is akin to the argument the defendant made—and lost—in Rosen. That defendant insisted that he could not be convicted for mailing the paper “unless he knew or believed that such paper could be properly or justly characterized as obscene.” 161 U. S., at 41. The Court, however, held that the Government did not need to show that the defendant “regard[ed] the paper as one that the statute forbade to be carried in the mails,” because the obscene character of the material did not “depend upon the opinion or belief of the person who . . . assumed the responsibility of putting it in the mails.” Ibid. The majority’s muddying of the waters cannot ob­ scure the fact that today’s decision is irreconcilable with Rosen and Hamling. D The majority today at least refrains from requiring an intent to threaten for §875(c) convictions, as Elonis asks us to do. Elonis contends that proof of a defendant’s intent to put the recipient of a threat in fear is necessary for conviction, but that element cannot be found within the statutory text. “[W]e ordinarily resist reading words or elements into a statute that do not appear on its face,” including elements similar to the one Elonis proposes. E.g., Bates v. United States, 522 U. S. 23, 29 (1997) (de­ clining to read an “intent to defraud” element into a crimi­ nal statute). As the majority correctly explains, nothing in the text of §875(c) itself requires proof of an intent to threaten. See ante, at 8–9. The absence of such a re­ quirement is significant, as Congress knows how to re­ quire a heightened mens rea in the context of threat of­ fenses. See §875(b) (providing for the punishment of “[w]hoever, with intent to extort . . . , transmits in inter­ state or foreign commerce any communication containing