Cite as: 575 U. S. ____ (2015) 1 THOMAS, J., dissenting SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________ No. 13–983 _________________ ANTHONY DOUGLAS ELONIS, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT [June 1, 2015] JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting. We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict in the lower courts over the appropriate mental state for threat prose­ cutions under 18 U. S. C. §875(c). Save two, every Circuit to have considered the issue—11 in total—has held that this provision demands proof only of general intent, which here requires no more than that a defendant knew he transmitted a communication, knew the words used in that communication, and understood the ordinary mean­ ing of those words in the relevant context. The outliers are the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, which have concluded that proof of an intent to threaten was necessary for con­ viction. Adopting the minority position, Elonis urges us to hold that §875(c) and the First Amendment require proof of an intent to threaten. The Government in turn advo­ cates a general-intent approach. Rather than resolve the conflict, the Court casts aside the approach used in nine Circuits and leaves nothing in its place. Lower courts are thus left to guess at the appro­ priate mental state for §875(c). All they know after to­ day’s decision is that a requirement of general intent will not do. But they can safely infer that a majority of this Court would not adopt an intent-to-threaten requirement, as the opinion carefully leaves open the possibility that recklessness may be enough. See ante, at 16–17.