C.P. No. 3506/2020 12 that PEMRA can exercise its power to impose fine on a licensee for any such contravention in respect of any aspect of a programme or advertisement, without first obtaining the opinion of the Council of Complaints concerned. For, the provisions of Section 29(6) are to be read with the provisions of Section 26(5) and given effect accordingly. 17. It has also been argued on behalf of PEMRA that the Councils of Complaints have no power to receive and review complaints against any “advertisement” under Section 26(2), while PEMRA has such power under Section 27(a); therefore, the power of PEMRA under Section 27(a) is independent of the provisions of Section 26. It is true that the word “advertisement” is not mentioned in subsection (2) of Section 26 but it is found mentioned in subsection (5) thereof. The omission of this word in subsection (2) of Section 26 appears to be an accidental one, as it does not fit within the overall intent of the legislature manifested from reading the provisions of Section 26 as a whole. Needless to say that the ultimate object of the process of interpretation of a statute is to find out what the legislature must have intended and then to give effect to that intent of the legislature,10 and in order to give effect to the manifest intent of the legislature, the courts can supply the inadvertent omission of the draftsman by reading the necessary words in the statute.11 Subsection (5) of Section 26 clearly empowers the Councils of Complaints to make a recommendation to PEMRA for the action of censure or fine against a licensee for violation of the codes not only of programmes content but also of advertisements. The provisions of subsection (5) of Section 26 thus make the intent of the legislature abundantly clear that it intended to confer the power on the Councils of Complaints to receive and review complaints against any aspects of programmes or advertisements, which shall be so read in subsection (2) of Section 26, in order to give effect to that manifest intent of the legislature. 18. Lastly, the learned counsel for PEMRA contended that it cannot be possible to hold that the power of PEMRA under clause (a) of Section 27 is dependent on obtaining and considering the opinion of a Council of Complaint but its power under clause (b) of the same Section is an independent one. The question whether the power of PEMRA under clause (b) is or is not independent, does not arise in the circumstances of the present case; therefore, we do not consider it appropriate to take up 10 Badrul Haque v. Election Tribunal PLD 1963 SC 704 (5-MB); Reference No.1 of 2012 PLD 2013 SC 279 (5-MB). 11 Amir Khan v. Controller of Estate Duty PLD 1961 SC 119 (3-MB); Amir Khan v. Controller of Estate Duty PLD 1962 SC 335 (4-MB); Muhammad Ismail v. State PLD 1969 SC 241 (5-MB).