C.P. No. 3506/2020 17 the Constitution13 and right to information guaranteed under Article 19A of the Constitution. Freedom of expression and right to information are complementary fundamental rights and constitute essential foundations of a democratic society. It is applicable not only to information or ideas that are favourably received but also to those which offend, shock or disturb the State or any other sector of the population. Such are the demands of pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no democratic society.14 Freedom of expression is so fundamental a human right that one can have no other right unless one has this right and can ask for his rights.15 Freedom of expression thus begets all other freedoms, and the right to freedom of expression guarantees all other rights. It is because of the paramount importance of this right that it has been included in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)16 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)17. 27. Crucial though freedom of expression and right to information are to an open and democratic society, these rights are not absolute. Some reasonable restrictions can be imposed on these right by law in the interest of any of the objectives mentioned in Articles 19 and 19A of the Constitution.18 However, such restrictions must be “reasonable”19 and any ambiguity as to the reasonableness of a restriction must be resolved in favour of protecting the exercise of the fundamental right rather than enforcing the restriction.20 To ensure that they are not unnecessarily used to suppress the right, the clawback provisions of a law containing the restrictions on the right should be interpreted strictly and narrowly.21 The courts are to be conscious that in a fledgling democracy like ours, there is all the more need to jealously guard the right to freedom of expression and right to information. Given the pivotal importance of these fundamental rights in a democratic society, it is not enough for the State and its instrumentalities (including PEMRA) simply to claim that the restriction relates to a legitimate objective. The reasonable restrictions must also be proportionate in that the legitimate objective cannot reasonably be achieved through a means less restrictive of the right protected by the Constitution. The reasonable restrictions should therefore not only be 13 Leo Communication v. Federation, PLD 2017 Lah 709. Handyside v. United Kingdom, (1976) 1 EHRR 737 (European Court of Human Rights). 15 State of Human Rights in 2021 (Pakistan), Annual Report of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (Freedom of Expression, the main theme of the Report). 16 Pakistan became a signatory of the UDHR in 1948. 17 Pakistan ratified the ICCPR in 2010. 18 See also Article 19(3) of the ICCPR. 19 East Pakistan v. Sirajul Haq, PLD 1966 SC 854. 20 Nadeem Sarwar v. E.C.P, 2013 CLC 1481 (FB of LHC). 21 See General Comment No. 34 of the UN Human Rights Committee. 14