Case: 12-57302, 05/18/2015, ID: 9540348, DktEntry: 197-1, Page 19 of 42 GARCIA V. GOOGLE 19 provides a useful foundation. There, we examined the meaning of “work” as the first step in analyzing joint authorship of the movie Malcolm X. The Copyright Act provides that when a work is “prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole,” the work becomes a “joint work” with two or more authors. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added). Garcia unequivocally disclaims joint authorship of the film. In Aalmuhammed, we concluded that defining a “work” based upon “some minimal level of creativity or originality . . . would be too broad and indeterminate to be useful.”9 202 F.3d at 1233 (internal quotation marks omitted). Our animating concern was that this definition of “work” would fragment copyright protection for the unitary film Malcolm X into many little pieces: So many people might qualify as an “author” if the question were limited to whether they made a substantial creative contribution that that test would not distinguish one from another. Everyone from the producer and director to casting director, costumer, 9 Although the ultimate issue in Aalmuhammed pertained to joint authorship, the definition of “work” was essential, just as in our case, to the analysis. 202 F.3d at 1233–34; see also Richlin v. Metro-GoldwynMayer Pictures, Inc., 531 F.3d 962, 968 (9th Cir. 2008) (relying on Aalmuhammed in reasoning that to determine authorship, the court must first determine the “work” to be examined).