HURBAIN v. BELGIUM JUDGMENT – SEPARATE OPINIONS but at least with the aim of examining whether such measures might better protect the private life of the person concerned (see, as regards the consideration of other available measures, Węgrzynowski and Smolczewski, cited above, §§ 12 and 66) and, if necessary, refusing his or her request for alteration of the digital archive. 24. Furthermore, it is apparent from the comparative-law survey that in several States measures that are less restrictive of freedom of expression have been examined by the competent courts and authorities, and that some supreme courts have not hesitated to set aside decisions of the lower courts which did not consider the possibility of graduated protection or intermediate measures less severe than the anonymisation or removal of an article in the online archives (see, for example, paragraphs 92, 121 and 132 of the judgment). In its own case-law the Court has also taken into consideration the fact that the applicants did not take any steps to compel the search engine operators to make the information concerning the applicants less easy to find (see Fuchsmann, § 53, and M.L. and W.W. v. Germany, § 114, both cited above) or to request that the information of which they complained be rectified (see Węgrzynowski and Smolczewski, cited above, §§ 66-67). 25. These considerations are especially important in the present case since G.’s grievance seems to have related not so much to the article published online on the news publisher’s website, but rather to its continued accessibility following the indexing of the content by search engines. Moreover, the applicant and the Government agreed that the delisting of content by search engines was, as a general rule, preferable to alteration of the archives (see paragraphs 145 and 154 of the judgment) as a means of protecting freedom of expression to the greatest extent possible. The Belgian courts did not take this factor into consideration in their reasoning, but confined themselves to examining a few alternative measures referred to by the parties (see paragraphs 245-247 of the judgment). However, G. had several other measures available to him which, while producing a similar outcome for him, would have been significantly less damaging to freedom of the press and to the integrity of the archives. 26. In the light of the increasing migration of the press towards digital technology and the proliferation of online news portals, I also believe that when a request for alteration of a press article archived on the Internet is being examined, the fact that the print version of the same article remains intact, as in the present case, is not a factor to be considered. This approach does not appear to be contradicted by the practice of the competent authorities in the Council of Europe member States (see paragraphs 91 and 132 of the judgment). Like its journalistic aim, the historical purpose of a press archive that contributes to the creation of a collective memory is not changed by the fact that it is in digital format. Accordingly, in my view, online archives should be afforded the same protection as other types of archives, including those in print form. The majority, however, in attempting to limit the impact 101