HURBAIN v. BELGIUM JUDGMENT and distorted account of the past, hindering decision-making and accountability. 164. The third-party interveners stressed that the “right to be forgotten” was not an international legal standard. Initially, with the CJEU ruling in Google Spain (C-131/12), that right had been established in the context of personal data protection and its scope had been limited in a number of ways, applying only to search engines. While the “right to be forgotten” had subsequently been formalised in the GDPR, Article 17 of that Regulation nevertheless provided for an exception to the right to erasure in respect of data processed for journalistic purposes, an exception whose implementation varied in national legislation. Outside the European Union, the “right to be forgotten” was not expressly recognised in any international instruments or national constitutions. Moreover, at international level, numerous jurisdictions refused to recognise or apply a “right to be forgotten”, while others applied the remedy of delisting against search engines but not against the publishers of news archives. Even in a European context, in the few cases in which the courts had applied the “right to be forgotten” in relation to news archives, they had not ordered the complete erasure of the information. 165. In the light of the Court’s case-law, the third-party interveners submitted that restrictions on access to digital media archives, or their alteration, were rarely justified and required exceptional circumstances. In their view, there should be a presumption that the integrity of online media archives must be preserved and that any interference with that integrity should be subject to the strictest scrutiny. That scrutiny – which, in the interveners’ view, presupposed balancing the rights at stake – entailed an assessment of whether the measure was the least restrictive way to achieve the aim pursued. Although delisting by search engines or de-indexing by the publisher of the content constituted in principle unjustified interference with media freedom, they were less restrictive of freedom of expression. When such measures were applied the information continued to be accessible and the integrity of the archives was not affected. Furthermore, they prevented the creation of a public profile of a particular individual. With anonymisation the information lost its relevance and could simply cease to exist. In the interveners’ view, the potential effect on news outlets of ordering the alteration of content should not be overlooked, as they might overreact by deleting content in order to avoid legal proceedings or possible liability. Furthermore, such proceedings could lead to very high costs which could eventually force news outlets to close (the interveners cited the example of the newspaper in the recent case of Biancardi (cited above)). 166. Lastly, the third-party interveners submitted that the Court should consider three additional factors where the “right to be forgotten” was sought to be applied against the press. Firstly, the Court should consider whether the person claiming the “right to be forgotten” had suffered substantial harm going beyond mere embarrassment or discomfort. Where, in the context of 58