HURBAIN v. BELGIUM JUDGMENT – SEPARATE OPINIONS underlying the published data complained of in M.L. and W.W. had attracted “considerable public attention” (see M.L. and W.W. v. Germany, cited above, §§ 98 and 106). Secondly, the applicants in that case had acquired a certain notoriety because of the publicity surrounding their trial (ibid., § 106). Thirdly, the Court was especially critical of the conduct of the applicants in that case, who had “contacted the press” (ibid., § 108) in order to publicise their application for reopening of the criminal proceedings leading to their conviction. These three factors played a decisive role in M.L. and W.W. and do not apply in the present case. Furthermore, in M.L. and W.W. the criterion of contribution to a debate of public interest was satisfied (ibid., § 106). 22. The principle of the integrity of digital archives is cardinal and must constitute the “guiding principle”. Nevertheless, in exceptional circumstances this principle, despite its cardinal nature, may yield to an interest derived from another competing right guaranteed by the Convention. This may be the case where an individual is referred to by name in an article although the disclosure of his or her identity has no bearing on the information conveyed and/or causes, or is liable to cause, significant harm to his or her physical or psychological integrity. Consider, for instance, the case of a person who makes statements in an article or expresses a viewpoint therein, and who is later subjected to serious threats because of that position. Or the case of a person who is mentioned incidentally in a newspaper article in connection with an activity which she does not wish, or no longer wishes, to be a matter of public knowledge on an ongoing basis (see Khelili v. Switzerland, no. 16188/07, 18 October 2011). Dismissing out of hand any possibility of conducting a balancing exercise, in the name of an absolute principle of the integrity of digital archives, could prove problematic in terms of the competing requirements of Article 8, which, according to our case-law, deserve equal respect (see Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy, cited above, § 123). Moreover, the integrity of the archives cannot enjoy absolute protection under Article 10 of the Convention, in so far as that provision does not guarantee an absolute right. C. “Right to remember” versus “right to be forgotten”? 23. Personally, I am not fully persuaded by the recognition under Article 10 of the Convention of a “right to remember” in favour of the press, as a kind of counterbalance to the “right to be forgotten” under Article 8. The Court must be particularly careful in appropriating such concepts in order to avoid employing notions that create more questions than answers. In this instance, my reservations relate primarily to the fact that, while an individual may invoke a personal right to protection of his or her reputation under Article 8 (see Pfeifer v. Austria, no. 12556/03, § 35, 15 November 2007), I struggle to see how a journalist or a news publisher can possess, on 91