GLUKHIN v. RUSSIA JUDGMENT democratic society in order to achieve any such aim (see Roman Zakharov v. Russia [GC], no. 47143/06, § 227, ECHR 2015). 75. The protection of personal data is of fundamental importance to a person’s enjoyment of his or her right to respect for private and family life, as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention. The domestic law must afford appropriate safeguards to prevent any such use of personal data as may be inconsistent with the guarantees of this Article. The need for such safeguards is all the greater where the protection of personal data undergoing automatic processing is concerned, not least when such data are used for police purposes (see S. and Marper, cited above, § 103), and especially where the technology available is continually becoming more sophisticated (see Catt, cited above, § 114; Gaughran, cited above, § 86; and Uzun, cited above, § 61). The protection afforded by Article 8 of the Convention would be unacceptably weakened if the use of modern scientific techniques in the criminal-justice system were allowed at any cost and without carefully balancing the potential benefits of the extensive use of such techniques against important private-life interests (see S. and Marper, cited above, § 112). 76. Personal data revealing political opinions, such as information about participation in peaceful protests, fall in the special categories of sensitive data attracting a heightened level of protection (see Catt, cited above, §§ 112 and 123). 77. In the context of the collection and processing of personal data, it is therefore essential to have clear, detailed rules governing the scope and application of measures, as well as minimum safeguards concerning, inter alia, duration, storage, usage, access of third parties, procedures for preserving the integrity and confidentiality of data and procedures for their destruction, thus providing sufficient guarantees against the risk of abuse and arbitrariness (see S. and Marper, cited above, § 99, and P.N. v. Germany, no. 74440/17, § 62, 11 June 2020). (ii) Application to the present case 78. The Court considers that in the present case the questions of lawfulness and of the existence of a legitimate aim cannot be dissociated from the question of whether the interference was “necessary in a democratic society” (see S. and Marper, cited above, § 99; Nemtsov v. Russia, no. 1774/11, § 75, 31 July 2014; and Elvira Dmitriyeva v. Russia, nos. 60921/17 and 7202/18, § 77, 30 April 2019). It will therefore examine them together below. 79. According to the domestic authorities and the Government, the measures taken against the applicant had a legal basis in the CAO, the OSAA, the Police Act and Decree no. 410. 80. The Court would begin by noting that operational-search activities could be performed only in connection with an offence classified as “criminal” under the domestic law (see paragraph 24 above). The OSAA 25