2 FBI v. FAZAGA Opinion of the Court such effect, and we therefore reverse. I A This Court has repeatedly recognized “a Government privilege against court-ordered disclosure of state and military secrets,” General Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 563 U. S. 478, 484 (2011); see also United States v. Zubaydah, ___ U. S. ___, ___ (2022) (slip op., at 7); Tenet v. Doe, 544 U. S. 1, 11 (2005); United States v. Reynolds, 345 U. S. 1, 6–7 (1953); Totten v. United States, 92 U. S. 105, 107 (1876). The present case requires us to determine whether FISA affects the availability or scope of that longestablished privilege. Electronic surveillance for ordinary criminal law enforcement purposes is governed by Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U. S. C. §§2510–2522, but foreign intelligence surveillance presents special national-security concerns, and Congress therefore enacted FISA to provide special procedures for use when the Government wishes to conduct such surveillance. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U. S. 398, 402 (2013). FISA established the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to entertain applications for and, where appropriate, to issue orders authorizing such surveillance. See id., at 402–403; 50 U. S. C. §§1803–1805. When information is lawfully gathered pursuant to such an order, §1806 permits its use in judicial and administrative proceedings and specifies the procedure that must be followed before that is done. Under §1806(c), “[w]henever the Government intends to enter into evidence or otherwise use or disclose . . . against