03/02/2020 Privacy International v Secretary of State for Foreign And Commonwealth Affairs & Ors (Rev 2) [2016] UKIPTrib 15_110-CH (17 October 2016) Bulk Personal Data Policy of November 2015), that there should then be an improvement in respect of its oversight. Although there had been some oversight of BPD prior to 2010 by the then I S Commissioner Sir Peter Gibson, and Sir Paul Kennedy as I C C included consideration of BPD on his visits between January 2011 and May 2015, the major oversight of BPD was by Sir Mark Waller, Sir Peter Gibson's successor, as from December 2010, on his bi-annual visits.  There is a short summary of his supervision in paragraph 56 of the Respondents' Amended Response to the Claimant's Supplemental Request for Further Information. This does not adequately take into account (because it was prior to their disclosure in open) the content of the Confidential Annexes to his Reports,  particularly those between 2011 and 2013, which we have read, and, for example, in the 2013 Annexe  he referred to the nature of his oversight of BPD: "*Firstly I require the services to provide me with a list of all data sets held. What I am concerned to do is to assess whether the tests of the necessity and proportionality of acquiring and retaining the data sets has been properly applied in relation to decisions to acquire, retain or delete those data sets. This is normally quite straightforward because each service has an internal review body which considers the retention of data sets on a regular basis and records the decision in writing. These documents are available for me to inspect. *I then consider how operatives and which operatives gain access to the data sets and review how the necessity and proportionality (i.e. the justification) of that intrusion is maintained. *Finally I review the possible misuse of data and how this is prevented. I consider this to be the most important part of my oversight in that it seems to me that *it is critical to that access to bulk data is properly controlled and *it is the risk that some individuals will misuse the powers of access to private data which must be most carefully guarded against." We have considered the relevant parts of his recent Report of 8th September, since the hearing, and the short written submissions of the parties in relation to it, which we invited. It is apparent that he has continued a rigorous oversight, and he will no doubt consider as such oversight continues, the important suggestions which the Claimant makes. 82. Although the oversight by the I S Commissioner was not made statutory until March 2015, as set out in paragraph 13 above, the careful recital was that: "The Intelligence Services Commissioner must continue [our underlining] to keep under review ..." It was thus recognised that the supervision had previously existed. We are satisfied that during the period of Sir Mark Waller's supervision the independent oversight of BPD had been and continued to be adequate. Conclusions as to BCD and BPD in the period pre-Avowal 83. Criticisms are made by the Claimant of the BPD and BCD systems which antedate March 2015, including specifically processes relating to BPD, which were discontinued (or corrected) in (severally) 2012, 2013, 2014 and February 2015 (paragraphs 78(b), 78(e), 77 and 78(c) of the Claimant's Skeleton Argument), and in relation to BCD in November 2015 (paragraph 68(d)). In particular there was no adequate dealing with legal and professional privilege until after this Tribunal's decision in Belhadj in February 2015.  However most of the criticisms were either overtaken by the public avowal of the existence of BCD and BPD and the publication of the Handling Arrangements, or they remain as criticisms now, to consideration of which we shall return below. 84. Our conclusion is in any event that by virtue of the matters which we have set out in paragraphs 67 to 81 above: www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/format.cgi?doc=/uk/cases/UKIPTrib/2016/15_110-CH.html&query=([2016])+AND+(UKIPTrib)+AND+(15_110-CH) 24/53