03/02/2020 Privacy International v Secretary of State for Foreign And Commonwealth Affairs & Ors (Rev 2) [2016] UKIPTrib 15_110-CH (17 October 2016) referred in paragraph 95 above, namely that "while these controls apply inside the [SIAs], they do not apply to overseas partners with whom the [SIAs] may share the datasets." 100. We are satisfied, in respect of the BPD regime, that as from 12 March 2015 (the date of the ISC Report) there was sufficient satisfaction of the principle of foreseeability. 101. Accordingly, our conclusion is, in respect of Issues 2 and 3, that, subject to the issue of transfer of data, and to resolution of Issue 4 below, the s.94 BCD regime did not comply with Article 8 until November 4 2015 and thereafter complies, and that the BPD regime did not comply with Article 8 until 12 March 2015 and thereafter complies. We so decide. 102. It does not follow that a complainant who establishes that his or her complaint falls within the jurisdiction of this Tribunal, as explained in paragraphs 49 to 63 of our Judgment in Human Rights Watch & Ors v Secretary of State for the Foreign & Commonwealth Office & Ors [ 2016] UKIP Trib 15_165-CH, but who has no ground to believe that his or her data have been accessed and examined, would have an actionable personal complaint on the grounds that the BCD and BPD regimes under which such data were obtained and retained were, until those dates, non-compliant with Article 8 and therefore unlawful. ISSUE 4:Proportionality 102. Since the hearing, Mr. Anderson QC has published, as referred to in paragraph 21 above, his Bulk Powers Review.  It is plainly highly relevant to this issue, and we propose to grant both parties the opportunity to make submissions upon it before reaching our conclusions in respect of this issue, which we consequently adjourn, to come on to be heard at the same time as the EU law issues. _____________ APPENDIX A: THE SECTION 94 REGIME 1. The regime in respect of section 94 of the Telecommunications Act 1984 which is relevant to the activities of the Intelligence Services principally derives from the following statutes: (a) the Security Services Act 1989 ("the SSA") and the Intelligence Services Act 1994 ("the ISA"); (b) the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 ("the CTA"); (c) Section 94 of the Telecommunications Act 1984; (d) the Human Rights Act 1998 ("the HRA"); (e) the Data Protection Act 1998 ("the DPA"); and (f) the Official Secrets Act 1989 ("the OSA"). 2. In addition, GCHQ and MI5 have a number of internal arrangements in relation to Section 94; see below. 3. In addition: (a) MI5 has, as a matter of practice and policy, applied the procedures and safeguards contained in the Acquisition and Disclosure of Communications Data Codes of Practice 2007 and 2015 to its access to Bulk Communications Data obtained under Section 94 of the Telecommunications Act 1984: (b) GCHQ has throughout the periods under consideration as a matter of policy applied the appropriate safeguards set out in the Interception of Communications Code of Practice 2002 and, subsequently, the Interception of Communications Code of Practice 2016, to all operational data, including BCD obtained under s.94 directions. www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/format.cgi?doc=/uk/cases/UKIPTrib/2016/15_110-CH.html&query=([2016])+AND+(UKIPTrib)+AND+(15_110-CH) 28/53