- 5 were not committed because of ignorance of law. I have also taken into consideration the need to keep objectionable disparities in sentencing for like offences to the minimum. It is in the light of all the above, that I considered whether the learned Magistrate was wrong in principle to have passed a deterrent sentence upon the Appellant since he is a first offender, and whether the sentence in all the circumstances was too sever and manifestly excessive. Where deterrence is the paramount consideration because of the particular facts or circumstances of the case, then a robust approach to sentencing is appropriate [per Li V-P in AG. v. TANG King-ming [1986] HKLR 211]. A deterrent sentence may be in personam or in rem. Normally if the circumstances that pertain to an offender are such that the court is of the opinion that it must be brought home to him that he is not to commit such offences again, for example, a repeat offender, a deterrent sentence in personam is proper. When an offence is, inter alia, so prevalent or is so serious within its class, and the court is of the opinion that those of like minds are to be strongly discouraged from committing the same or similar offences, then a deterrent sentence in rem is called for. The case of HO Kau has often been cited in support of the proposition that it was wrong in principle to pass a deterrent sentence on a first offender. However, if the judgment of Addison J. was read, it is clear that the learned judge did not in fact say that. At page 198 of the report, Addison J. said: “The principle that a deterrent sentence ought not to be imposed on a first offender was enunciated in the case of R v. Curran (1973) 57 Cr. App. R. 945, 947. There Mr. Justice MacKenna said this: -