Wednesbury which relate to decision, are not applicable in this matter. Second, there is no evidence showing that the definitions of those terms was a mandatory requirement under the parent Act. Third, the parent Act is the EPOCA and not the Cybercrime Act, 2015; therefore, the provisions of section 45 are not applicable. Fourth, the case of Vice Chancellor, M.D. University, Rohtak cited by learned counsel for the applicants is inapplicable to this case because we are not dealing with the date when the Regulations came into operation. Fifth, since the enabling Act did not set the time, I see nothing wrong for the subsidiary legislation to do so. Sixth, we are not bound to follow the UK in our legislation and there is no evidence for the rationale. Submitting on ground No. 3, learned counsel dwelt heavily on the principle of proportionality but as I hinted hereinbefore, this ground was not pleaded and I, therefore, refrain from discussing it. Besides, the issue of illegality and unreasonableness have been tackled in grounds 1 and 2 above. Coming to grounds Nos. 4 and 5, it was submitted on part of the applicants that regulation 4 (b) is subjective and thus prone to arbitrary use as it fails to mention which action to be taken. Here, it is not clear whether the complaint by the applicants is the arbitrariness or vagueness of the said provision. As correctly submitted by learned state attorney, there is no ambiguity or arbitrary use of the above provision. When this provision is read in conjunction with other provisions of the 21